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ABSTRACT
Doing and Interpreting Lyrical Sociology:
Living in Detroit
Gregory Joseph Wurm
Department of Sociology, BYU
Master of Science
This thesis examines, experiments with, and theorizes the value of lyrical sociology as an
approach to social scientific research. A lyrical sociology, as proposed by Andrew Abbott, seeks
to describe an author’s emotional response to a phenomenon rather than explain it. This allows
for a researcher’s own experience to play a role in the research process in a way that helps the
reader to connect emotionally and ethically to both the world they read about and the world they
themselves are a part of. It has valuable implications for the way researchers relate to their
research, their research subjects, their audience, and ultimately their own lives. I start by
situating lyrical sociology within the broader context of the discipline, and the social sciences
more generally, and then elaborate upon the specific stance and mechanics required of the writer
and reader of lyrical works. Next, I present a series of lyrical vignettes about the time I spent
living as a missionary in inner-city Detroit. Lastly, I give an analysis and reflection on what I
learned from the process of writing and reading these stories and then conclude with a discussion
on future directions lyrical sociology can take.

Keywords: lyrical sociology, narrative, ethics, emotion, ethnography, reading, urban sociology,
theory
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Doing and Interpreting Lyrical Sociology:
Living in Detroit

INTRODUCTION
In the first chapter of his 2015 book, Reconstructing Sociology: The Critical Realist
Approach, Douglas Porpora asks, “Do we need a philosophy of science or metatheory?” and
answers, “Well, yes. The fact is you already have one. The question is whether you have the
right one” (7). Every sociological enterprise is built on a series of assumptions about the way the
world is, the way it works, and the way we come to this knowledge. Though these guiding
beliefs are not explicitly acknowledged or communicated in the course of our day to day
research, from time to time it is helpful, even necessary, to reflexively think about how we do
sociology. In a 2007 article titled, “Against Narrative: A Preface to Lyrical Sociology,” Andrew
Abbott does just this.
Abbott seeks to develop an approach to doing sociology that avoids the general storytelling structure inherent in most conventional ways of research and report, whether quantitative
or qualitative, and re-imagines the role of the social researcher. While quantitative methods rely
upon “reified variables” and qualitative methods upon “concrete actors” (Abbott 2007a:70), both
seek to tell a story of the data they gather, namely ‘what happened and why?’ In this way, the
two methodologies, which are often pitted against one another, are more similar than different in
that they are both acutely aimed toward explanation. Lyrical sociology, however, rather than
trying to explain the world through sequences of variables or events, envisions an approach to
sociology that centers on an “image or images” of the social world at a particular moment in
time. Doing so allows the researcher to view reality in “different ways, through different lenses,”
and “evoke the sources of [his or her own] emotional reaction” (76). Lyrical sociology is thus,
for Abbott, a “particular author’s emotional relation to a certain kind of social moment” (77)
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rather than a general researcher’s distanced—often causal—interpretation of a temporal
sequence.
Abbott’s article, which is part of his larger project toward the development of a genuinely
“processual sociology” (Abbott 2016b), outlines this lyrical approach in detail by drawing upon
literary theory, the philosophy of time and emotion, as well as a variety of previous sociological
works that he identifies as either lyrical or narrative. Of those he places in the lyrical camp, he
mentions, among others, Harvey Zorbaugh’s (1929) The Gold Coast and the Slum, Bronisław
Malinowski’s ([1922] 1961) Argonauts of the Western Pacific, Michael Bell’s (1994) Childerley,
and Nicholas Christakis’ (1999) Death Foretold. Reviews of these works, by readers other than
Abbott, highlight precisely what Abbott contends make them exemplary of the lyrical impulse he
hopes to establish in other social scientific writing (Abbott 2007a:96) and are worth giving and
commenting on here briefly.
Of Zorbaugh’s book, a Chicago-based ecumenical magazine wrote, “Here is a type of
sociological investigation which is equally marked by human interest and scientific method”
(“Christian Century” 1929). In the preface to Argonauts, Sir James G. Frazer praises
Malinowki’s approach:
It is characteristic of Dr. Malinowski’s method that he takes full account of the
complexity of human nature. He sees man, so to say, in the round and not in the flat. He
remembers that man is a creature of emotion at least as much as of reason… The man of
science, like the man of letters, is too apt to view mankind only in the abstract, selecting
for his consideration a single side of our complex and many-sided being (Frazer [1922]
1961:ix).
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Abbott himself says of Malinowski: “Malinowski wants us to see the Trobrianders as he saw and
felt them. He falls out of his scientific pose again and again, not because he is a Westerner or a
colonialist or a Pole or a man, but because he is too good a lyricist not to” (2007a:75).
In lyrical sociology, the scientific and the humanistic are not mutually exclusive but
pursued simultaneously as offering a more rounded view of social life. Research is still to be
conducted intellectually within a “framework of rigor” (96), but not at the expense of the
author’s own emotional engagement with the research. In fact, Abbott suggests that in
Zorbaugh’s case, “it is to some extent the rigor of his book—its multiple roots in interviews,
document search, and observation—that allows him to see what is so exciting about the new
North Side” (74; emphasis in original). And, no doubt, passionate engagement with one’s topic
can likewise be helpful in pushing through the taxing meticulousness required of all worthwhile
inquiry.
In the final few lines reviewing Bell’s book Childerly, sociologist Wendy Griswold
concludes:
The reader, this reader anyway, finishes Childerley with the feeling that she has just
returned from visiting a remote Hampshire village and has learned something, not just
about that place, but about human social life lived in other places and lived through place
itself. Bell has succeeded in doing what all ethnographies aim at, which is to convey
something of the experience of T. S. Eliot's traveler in “Little Gidding:” “We shall not
cease from exploration/And the end of all our exploring/Will be to arrive where we
started/And know the place for the first time” (Griswold 1995:1651).
A rigorous intellectual and emotional engagement with one’s work proffers an entirely unique
sort of experience for the reader. As medical anthropologist Daniel Moerman described after
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reading Christakis’s Death Foretold, “Reading this book was, for me, a curious experience. I
read a lot of medicine; my interests require that I read the reports of many randomized controlled
trials. But here, I was confronted with a book!” (Moerman 2001:133).
The first two reviewers express the uniqueness of the works reviewed in terms of how
they capture the multifaceted nature of human and social experience. The other two reviewers
focus on the experience of reading itself and how each came away with a type of knowledge and
understanding that was different, even inexplicable, to what they receive from other types of
similar works. What Abbott does in giving us these examples is provide support for his rather
deductive new theory of social research. He puts his finger on what makes each of these pieces
distinct and calls it lyrical sociology, stating that his aim is to “make old things look new and
perhaps provide us with a new way of reading the work of some of our colleagues, if not a new
way of writing our own” (2007a:73).
Since 2007, some have taken up the first part of this call, specifically to “look for
whatever pieces of lyrical sociology we can find” (73), to read previous works in a new light.
Brinkmann points to writings of French novelist Michel Houellebecq (2009a) and Danish poet
and filmmaker Jørgen Leth (2000b). Stock (2010) finds the lyrical impulse in William F.
Whyte’s Street Corner Society and James Agee’s and Walker Evan’s Let Us Now Praise Famous
Men. Penfold-Mounce, Beer, and Burrows (2011) even locate it in the hit television series “The
Wire.” However, as far as I can detect, no one has yet to take up the second part of Abbott’s
invitation and actually implement the lyrical approach at the outset of their research, to write
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their own lyrical sociology. 1 Indeed, Abbott notes that of even the works he cites, they “were
almost never conceived as wholly lyrical works” (2007a:73). 2
In this thesis, I apply the insights of lyrical sociology to write about the time I lived as a
missionary in inner-city Detroit. For Abbott, this setting is ideal since “the laws of human nature
and society are nowhere more evident than in the city” (72). My purposes are twofold: first, to
provide unique insight into the emotional tenor of the city, as Abbott would prescribe, and
second to provide a model for doing lyrical sociology from the ground up. 3 The methodological
approach(es) I utilize is part ethnography and part autoethnography in that the resulting selection
(chapter 4) includes vignettes that focus directly on my experiences with other people in Detroit
and vignettes that document my own personal experiences apart from these relationships. The
lyric allows for this sort of “in-between-ness” (Siddique 2011), since it is not committed to any
one way of getting at the social, but only one way of conveying that engagement.
During the time these experiences take place (from about July 2009 to June 2011), my
purpose was not to conduct research but rather perform specific ecclesiastical duties related to
my assignment as a missionary. Thus, I have had to rely upon journals, photos, conversations
with former acquaintances, and the techniques of introspection and emotional recall (Bochner
and Ellis 2002:210) to mine my mind retrospectively for the most sociologically pertinent
memories. I have also visited the city twice since then and driven, biked, and walked around the
areas I used to live and work (southwest Detroit from downtown to Dearborn everywhere below

Wakeman (2014) includes a short excerpt from his field notes that he purposely writes lyrically (as Abbott would
have it), but the piece itself in its entirety is not a standalone lyrical work. Nettleton (2013) also references Abbott’s
lyrical sociology throughout her paper, but the qualitative data she shares has nothing of her own emotional
reactions to qualify as being strictly lyrical either.
2
The lyricality of previous works were accidental (or natural) perhaps, rather than intentional; or, if anything, they
took their literary cues from outside the discipline rather than from within it. The point is that previous lyrical works
existed before Abbott’s piece on lyrical sociology but have not yet to come forth in their entirety as such since.
3
As Wall (2008) notes, new approaches to inquiry are often easier to talk about—or theorize on—than to actually
do.
1
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1-mile road) to help regain a thickness to my memories—though all the experiences included
here come from my first few years there.
Regarding rigor, as a missionary I spent every day for the two years from approximately
11am to 9pm amongst Detroiters—in homes, on porches, at parks, in grocery stores, on buses, in
laundromats, at hospitals, in abandoned buildings, and, most commonly, just out on the street—
rain, snow, or shine. 4 I talked to people about their dreams, faith, fears, challenges, families, and
whatever else they felt like sharing. As a religious representative, people would not only divulge
unsolicited thoughts and feelings, at levels and in ways that seem unlikely to be offered to
traditional social scientific researchers, but would also behave in ways that were perhaps more
natural than if being observed by these same unfamiliar outsiders—that is, until sufficient rapport
had been established. The reason why is because missionaries were a part of the fabric of social
life in Detroit. As an individual, I was new to the city; but as an institutional actor, missionaries
had a history with people that transcended my own time there. 5
The empirical portion of the thesis consists of these vignettes. Before entering into them
though, I take on the theoretical task of situating lyrical sociology in contrast to narrative and
among several of the prominent social scientific research methodologies and approaches in use
today. I will argue, with Abbott, that lyrical sociology is more than a method, but is instead a
way of seeing, or more specifically a way to present a certain way of seeing the world that

A missionary’s typical schedule was to arise at 6:30 in the morning, prepare one’s self for the day and then study
from 8-10am (for me, 11am because I was Spanish speaking and did an hour of language study). After morning
studies, we would go out until 9:00/9:30pm returning only for an hour or two for lunch/dinner sometime in the early
or late afternoon. If we were not in a house giving a presentation, we were walking or riding our bikes around and
talking to people on the street, on buses, or knocking doors. By the end of my time in Detroit, I had knocked on
almost every door in Southwest Detroit at least once, probably twice, and some three times.
5
Missionaries were sent to Detroit in as early as 1831 (Browne 1985:1), though have only had a sustained enough
presence in the city to make this claim for the past few decades or so.
4
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Abbott describes as “continuously in the process of making, remaking, and unmaking itself (and
other things), instant by instant” (Abbott 2016b:ix).
For Abbott lyrical sociology springs forth in response to this very processual ontology. I
will agree with him that we need to rethink social ontology, and thus epistemology too, but will
ground lyrical sociology in ethics rather than ontology, epistemology, or aesthetics even. Of the
latter, some scholars interpret Abbott’s piece primarily along these lines, calling lyrical sociology
“as close to art as sociology can get” (Tåhlin 2011:1078). And, it is easy to see why they would
do so. Abbott draws chiefly upon lyrical poetry and other humanities-based approaches and says
that he is primarily following in the tradition of Brown’s A Poetic for Sociology (1977), “a book
that derives aesthetic canons for sociological thinking from the vocabularies of literary, dramatic,
and artistic analysis” (Abbott 2007a:70). 6 However, he is constantly at pains to also point to a
humanistic and moral dimension that I will consider as the ethical. For him the lyric is more than
just stylistic writing, but must be, at its core, an assertion against narrative and “its most familiar
avatar in the social sciences—explanation” (73). In this way, his project overlaps in crucial ways
with the ethical phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas, a Lithuanian-born Jewish and French
thinker, who emphasized the need to avoid the totalizing reduction of people, places, and times
in both lived life and intellectual practice.
Zygmunt Bauman writes that Levinas is perhaps “the greatest moral philosopher of the
twentieth century,” that his philosophy uniquely provides a way to uncover an ethical demand
that is powerful without being forceful (Bauman 1991:214). Though any one aspect of Levinas’s

Abbott (2007a:74 footnote 13) leans in the aesthetic direction when discussing how he makes sense of the debates
over the merits of a shift toward greater subjectivity in the research process. He says, “But while we may differ
about whether this shift was desirable or lamentable, seeing it as right or wrong, scientific or unscientific, is a
mistake. The proper question is whether it is aesthetically successful. The problem with the new subjectivity may be
less that it is bad social science than that it is bad poetry.”
6
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approach is too involved to spell out in its entirety here, at times throughout the thesis I will
point to it, especially in places that he adds to or challenges Abbott. For, even in Abbott’s
masterfully crafted piece, there is still a lacuna between the aesthetics he describes and the type
of ethics he prescribes. I will argue that Levinas, and those who follow in his tradition (mostly
moral philosophers and literary critics: Attridge 2017; Craig 2010; Eaglestone 1997; Faulconer
2005; McDonald 2008, for example), have the intellectual resources to help fill this gap.
The thesis will thus proceed as follows: after situating lyrical sociology within the
broader context of the discipline, and the social sciences more generally (chapter 1), I will
elaborate upon the specific stance and mechanics required of the writer (chapter 2) and reader
(chapter 3) of lyrical works. Then, I will present my series of vignettes about the time I spent
living in Detroit (chapter 4). Lastly, I will give an analysis and reflection on what I learned from
the process of writing and reading these stories (chapter 5), since, as Takata and Leiting (1987)
suggest, there are certain insights you can only “learn by doing.” I conclude with a discussion on
future directions lyrical sociology can take.

8

CHAPTER 1: SITUATING LYRICAL SOCIOLOGY
Titles matter. If crafted well, they arouse curiosity and embody the argument of a piece—
and are often what is most retained in the quick pace of academic reading. As such, Abbott’s
title, “Against Narrative: A Preface to Lyrical Sociology,” fits the bill. As it suggests, his piece
juxtaposes narrative with an alternative approach he calls lyrical sociology. His article consists of
developing what he means by both narrative and lyrical and brands itself as a preface, or a
prolegomenon to a more broader theory of the lyric. Given this, more theoretical work is needed
for the idea of lyric to become sufficiently coherent and translatable. This will be my task
throughout the thesis but especially here. In this chapter, I first look briefly at the origin of the
lyric outside of sociology and examine how Abbott conceives of it, and narrative, in his own
work. I then discuss at length how Abbott positions lyrical sociology in contrast to what he
considers as narrative and give examples of three popular approaches entwined with narrative
thinking. I end by looking at how lyrical sociology is more than a method, but an approach that
can be used across a variety of methodological approaches depending on whether they meet
certain criteria.
Understanding Lyric and Narrative in Contemporary Sociology
Lyric, in the popular usage, is thought of today in the plural—lyrics—to refer to the
words of a song. In the original Greek, lyric signified such a song, “rendered to the
accompaniment of a lyre” (Abrams 2005:154). A lyre was a small harp-like instrument that was
played along with a type of poetry that was rightfully called, lyrical poetry. In the lyra family
was also the kithara, which is the etymological root of “guitar.” Lyrical poetry was different than
epic or narrative poetry, which was often accompanied by a flute. A lyric today, in literary
theory, is a “fairly short poem, uttered by a single speaker, who expresses a state of mind or a
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process of perception, thought or feeling” (153), while an epic is a long verse narrative often
featuring a heroic figure and an overcoming plot. While epic narratives are temporally
sequential, and have a strong teleology, lyrics are thought to hover in the timeless present.
Morgan (2009:3-4) contrasts the two:
Whereas narrative requires temporal progression and sequentiality, lyric is a suspended
moment that stops the time of narrative and focuses instead on the “now” of composition
and reception. Within this moment of suspended time, the poet can give free play to
thought and emotion, associating ideas and images that would not be linked by the chains
of cause and effect that typically govern narrative. The lyric poet can also make use of
this freedom from temporal progression to linger on the formal and figurative aspects of
language, thus calling attention to it as language. In contrast, the interests of narrative
cannot afford to dwell indefinitely on the formal beauties of its language: instead, a
narrative must make clear what is happening in the story, thus requiring a more
straightforward use of language (emphasis in original).
These distinctions between narrative and lyric have striking parallels with the way Abbott
conceives the two. This is because, for the most part, he derives his theory of lyrical sociology
from lyrical poetry (2007a:73), claiming even at one point that “[t]he history of genres in poetry
is surprisingly like the history of genres within sociology itself” (71). 7
Interestingly enough, starting around the early 1990s, and shortly before, Abbott argued
for an approach to social inquiry grounded in narrative (though in a more restricted sense than he

However, this point needs to be clarified. He says that in the field of poetics, “There is a hankering after work that
is instructive, a suppression of the emotional (at least other than the moralistic), [and] an insistence on high,
important topics” (71). While this seems to be the way he sees contemporary sociology too, he also observes that
“contemporary poets have largely stopped writing epics, odes, and the other formal subgenres of poetry” (83). For
Abbott then, it’s as if the fields of poetry and sociology not only do follow similar trajectories, but that they should,
with poetry leading the way.
7
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opposes in his piece on lyrical sociology). Critical of the variable-based sociology that had its
roots in logical positivism, he proposed an alternative approach he called “narrative positivism”
(Abbott 1992a). By narrative, he meant process or story, where social reality was conceived as
happening in “sequences of actions located within constraining or enabling structures” (428).
And by positivism, though he later remarks the term was mostly used rhetorically as a “guise”
(Abbott 2007b:196), 8 he meant an approach to studying social reality that consisted of
conceptualizing and relating various units of analysis through rigorous measurement and
“formal, usually statistical, models” (Abbott 1990b:436). Narrative positivism was seen as a way
to challenge the basic premises behind causal thinking in variable-based approaches.
To show this distinction, consider the simple rectangular layout of a quantitative dataset.
In the spreadsheet form, rows typically include units such as individual actors, entities, cases, or
events and columns the demographic, attitudinal, or other attributional properties of the rows,
represented by variables. The variable-based approach analyzes variables in terms of their
variance in relation to other variables. For example, what is the effect of the variable
representing a person’s race, class, or gender on the variable representing their educational or
occupational achievement? In the variable approach then, only the relationships between the
columns matter. A narrative approach, by contrast, focuses on the relationships between the
rows, between “particular social actors, in particular social places, at particular social times”
(Abbott 1992a:428). Reality does not occur in “time-bounded snap shots within which ‘causes’
affect one another… but as stories, cascades of events” (Abbott 1991:227).

Abbott believed that “positivism and interpretation [were] not in fact opposed ends of a spectrum, but different
moments of one process.” By interpretation he meant, “the position that holds that intersubjectivity in social life
dictates the use of non-positivist methods-e.g., verstehende methods” (Abbott 1990b:436). Thus, his project can be
seen as attempting to reconcile the two paradigms.
8
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In the narrative positivist approach then, time and history play a central role, with the
actor as the ultimate driver. Variable based approaches, he says, “attribute causality to the
variables – hypostatized social characteristics – rather than to agents; variables do things, not
social actors. Stories disappear (Abbott 1992a:428). The only narratives that exist in these
accounts are the stories the social scientist can tell about relations between variables, but this has
the problem of imputing agency onto properties, or qualities of actors, rather than being a quality
of actors themselves. 9 As he says elsewhere, “It is when a variable ‘does something’ narratively
that [analysts] think themselves to be speaking most directly of causality” (Abbott 1992b:58).
Therefore, in this sense, both variable-based and narrative positivist approaches tell stories—the
one thinking across cases (columns) and the other thinking along them (rows) (Abbott
1990a:148).
It is from this place that Abbott positions his lyrical sociology. He writes in his 2007
piece, “[A]nalytic social science and the new narratives of the 1990s are simply different
versions of the same thing: stories in the one case of variables and in the other of actors” (70). He
maps the two versions of storytelling onto mainstream quantitative and qualitative
methodologies respectively, though aptly recognizes that qualitative work can take on a variablebased approach (e.g. Ragin 1987) and quantitative approaches, as proposed, could proceed along
strongly narrative positivist lines, as actor-, or event-, centered. In this taxonomy, both species of
quantitative and qualitative approaches lie within the same larger genus of narrative he opposes
to the lyric. The lyric is thus of a different order, existing outside the rectangular box of columns
and rows, or outside of storytelling all together (see figure 1).
(Figure 1 about here)
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Abbott (1992a:432) writes that a world in which forces act upon forces is “a terrain removed from human activity.”
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Separating Lyric and Narrative
Abbott emphasizes the need to conceptually distinguish between the more general
category of narrative and uniquely lyrical modes of comprehension. “If we cannot separate the
two,” he writes, “then the lyric focus on moments is just part of the larger enterprise of telling a
story, whether of causes or of actions” (2007a:82). Those who conflate narrative and lyrical ways
of thinking often do so under the assumption that “all lyric is historical” (82), and therefore
reduce the present to the determinacy of past events (or past events to the even further past).
Adorno (1989:160), for example, writes how “objective historical forces rouse themselves in the
[lyric] poem” (quoted in Abbott 2007a:82). Those who argue for a radical separation go so far as
to argue that the lyric is “fundamentally anti-historical,” focused entirely on the present “to the
exclusion of other times” (Abbott 2007a:84). 10 Abbott clearly favors the latter view, though with
some qualifications.
First off, Abbott says that the present, or the lyrical moment, “need not be literally
instantaneous,” but can “last for months if not years” (85). In fact, time itself can be better
understood as a series of presents. The crime of narrative, and especially most historical
sociology, is that it sacrifices the past’s presents to the present’s present, to the “what we know
now” of an event rather than to the mysterious unfolding of the future at that time. He writes:
Historical narrative, as customarily understood . . . trac[es] events from beginning to end
via the succession of events in the middle. What such narrative loses, of course, is the
fact that each one of the intermediate events was a present at one point, and hence open to

The “anti-historical” nature of the lyric is better thought of as an “infolding of past and future into a nonnarrative
present” (Abbott 2007a:84 footnote 20), rather than an essential exclusion of either (past or present). Lyrical
sociology is still therefore historical in the true sense—and radically so—in that it is very much so concerned with
the passage of time (though as passing away and transitory rather than as a fixed and permanent structure). There is
a dialectic of sorts between this “infolding of past and future” into the present and the unfolding of the past and
future from the present that the lyric is well suited to capture.
10
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all sorts of realizations, not just the one that obtained in actuality. . . . The longer the
narrative we tell, the heavier is this weight of teleology, the less our story can be an
unfolding of unknowns, and the more we feel ahead of time the inevitable emergence of
whatever end did in fact close that particular narrative (86).
A lyrical approach, with its focus on the presents of the past, is thus the only way to preserve the
pastness of the past—or rather the past’s own indexical presentness 11—as well as do justice to
those who lived in it (a point I will return to in chapter 2).
The second qualification Abbott would have is that lyrical sociology is only “antihistorical” in one sense. Related to the previous point, the extended presents, which are the focus
of the lyrical standpoint, always exist within “clear bookends of historical transition” (85).
Whatever the length of the moment the social scientist writes about (months or years), it is
always a selection out of an immemorial past and, by this writing, a projection into a contingent
future. 12 The necessary “framing of the moment with transitions on both sides,” Abbott writes,
“intensifies our sense of it as a moment, precisely because it is embedded in a continuous and
inevitable flow of time and change” (85 emphasis in original).
The difference between this contextualization of the moment to that which is done in
narrative approaches is that the latter provides an overarching explanatory framework that
connects all of the events while the structure of the former, or the lyric, exists merely as a “loose

Attridge (2017:146) writes of the presentness of the past, “This present is unlike the present of the objects that I
see around me, or of the words on the page as material entities; the very presentness of the words I read is premised
on their pastness, on their having been written by another person in a different present”. Thus, by focusing on the
presentness of the past, lyrical sociology is opposed to the pastness of the present, which would be the historically
determined view of the present.
12
Regarding the lyrics relationship to the future, Attridge (2017:85) writes that a text is “never entirely insulated
from the contingencies of the history into which it is projected and within which it is read.” This means that the text
itself exists in the same way as the subjects of the text; it is both written and read at specific times and places by
specific writers and readers. Moreover, a text can be both written and read over a duration of different presents,
making a determinate interpretation of it impossible.
11
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framework holding together disparate images” (81). In contrast to the lengthy and weighty
narratives critiqued above, Abbott writes then that “the indeterminate character of historical
passage moment to moment is actually clearest in the shortest possible narratives: that is, in
purely momentary “stories,” or—in another word—in lyrics” (86). Therefore, though Abbott is
“against narrative,” he is not against the use of narratives (or stories); and the same could be said
of the way he relates to history (not anti-historical, but anti-reductive approaches to history that
reduce variegated phenomena to monochrome explanations).
The separation between narrative and lyrical ways of thinking can also be viewed as a
separation between narrative and narratives, history (from the time and place of one objective
historian) and histories (from the times and places of many historical actors), explanation and
explanations, etc., but this point too must be clarified. Pluralizing terms is surely not a new
theoretical maneuver. Many others have challenged singular reductionist logics by arguing for
shifts in perspective from such concepts as modernity to modernities (Eisenstadt 2000), family to
families (Morgan 2011), and secularism to secularisms (Casanova 2006). Though these are
worthwhile critiques, pluralization can easily slip into conceptual relativism and incoherence if
taken to the extreme, such as with Brinkmann (2009b) who uses lyrical sociology to praise
Danish poet Jørgen Leth for his technique of writing poetry that duplicates precisely the
fragmented observations he makes in his notebooks. Lyrical sociology, though, cannot just be a
series of random fieldnotes, no matter how “lyrical” each of the individual bits are. There has to
be some sort of analytic framework, even if it’s a “loose” one (Abbott 2007a:81), and there has
to exist historical “bookends” (85) from which the researcher can contextualize the lyrical
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moment(s) of their study. 13 Lyrical sociology can thus be said to exist somewhere between the
two extremes of rigid modernist narrative and disjointed postmodern narratives. 14
Reverting to narrative ways of thinking is typical of how most qualitative research
methodologies defend themselves from such allegations of relativism, mere description, or
theoretical non-generativity. 15 Grounded theory, for example, tries to code words and/or patterns
to determine the broader sociological “story,” with the intent of using them as evidence to speak
to the most admired qualitative question of all, “what is this a case of?” (Lincoln and Guba
1985). The extended case method, as Michael Burawoy (1998:5) writes, seeks to “extract the
general from the unique, to move from the ‘micro’ to the ‘macro,’ and to connect the present to
the past in anticipation of the future, all by building on preexisting theory” (quoted in Abbot
Though Abbott doesn’t explicitly defend himself from this critique (perhaps purposefully), it can be implied from
these ancillary remarks and from the examples he gives of lyrical texts which manifestly don’t take on this form.
14
Lyrical sociology, as I interpret Abbott, can be said to exist somewhere between modernist narrative and
postmodernist narratives. It doesn’t lose sight of its goal in its critique, that is “to find the laws of social life”
(Abbott 2007a:72). Though it remains a forceful challenge to the absolutist tendency of trying to explain everything
(Brinkmann 2015:621), it is, or what I would argue should be, also equally challenging to the absolutist retreat from
explanation entirely. Others see this need for lyrical sociology to lie somewhere in the middle (or outside) of the two
extremes. Isaac Reed (2011:90 footnote 1) writes, “Although Abbott articulates quite well a core aspect of
hermeneutic sociology—the willingness to openly engage the social actions of interest in all their strangeness and
concreteness—I am of the view that interpretive analysis can have a lyrical moment that is then elaborated into an
explanation—an explanation that attends to causes excluded by, and uses schemas foreign to, the more standard
explanatory projects of social science.” And Michael Bell (2011:17), who Abbott praises for his strikingly lyrical
ethnography, likewise states, “I, too, am impatient with the continued conception of sociology as merely an
“explanatory science,” to quote the common phrase. And I, too, seek to widen the communicative possibilities of
sociology. But, as will emerge, I am not “against narrative,” as Abbott proclaims himself. Nor am I opposed to
explanation. Rather, I ask for a sociology that is not only explanatory and not only narrative (especially such opaque
and listless narrative). Plus, I try to do more than re-create the experience of social discovery [Abbott 2007a:70]. I
try to create it and to understand the conditions of the unexplainable that creation, in contrast to mere reproduction,
entails (parentheses in original). Though both Reed and Bell evidently oppose Abbott’s strong stance against
narrative and explanation, I would argue that Abbott might even agree with them, or at least not disagree entirely
with their critiques. This is because Abbott focuses his piece more on the issue of moving the discipline from
explanation to evocation—not from explaining in the wrong way to explaining in the right way—and so it isn’t
really clear if he would abandon the explanatory project completely. This is an astute move, in my opinion, so that
lyrical sociology doesn’t just become another way of getting at the same thing as narrative, explanation. However, I
would note, just because a lyrical sociology doesn’t pursue explanation, it doesn’t mean the grounds for explanation
could not ensue from the better, or at least different, type of knowledge that the lyric provides—or even the grounds
for the unexplainable, as Bell suggests.
15
Abbott expresses how lyrical sociology too has been accused of being “‘just description,’ ‘mere journalism,’ ‘not
causal,’ ‘not really sociological,’ and so on” (2007a:96 footnote 42). Sadly, he mentions he had to cut his analysis
and presumed rebuttal to these accusations in the interest of space. I also note that these more qualitative methods
also emerge in reaction to positivism but end up becoming more like it than different.
13
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2007a:87). And, auto-ethnographers argue that the research subject’s own self can be the subject
of their sociological study since that self is socially constituted. 16
In all of these approaches, the move from ‘micro’ to ‘macro’ is relatively easy, since the
‘macro’ is theorized to be located in the ‘micro.’ 17 Or, in other words, since larger forces
determine individual situations, studying individual cases can help the researcher likewise
determine these very same larger forces. 18 The entire enterprise, however, is a justificatory
narrative built on “mixing ‘large’ and ‘small’ things” (Abbott 2007a:80). People’s lives are
explained both temporally and socially, Abbott writes, “not in terms of how they experience it
but in terms of some larger narrative or social structure in which they are embedded” (95). 19 The
lyrical moment is put “in the service of (larger) narrative” (87), rather than the other way around
(83), and the indescribable reality of the local present is reduced to whatever story can be told
about it.

As Adams and Manning (2015:352) state, “The primary assumption of autoethnography is that (general) culture
flows through the (specific) self; a person cannot live absent of or from cultural influences. Thus, autoethnographers
presume that writing about the self is simultaneously writing about cultural values, practices, and experiences.”
17
Abbott does not believe that you can find the generalized other in the self—or the macro in the micro, like many
symbolic interactionists do—but only a particular self in relation to particular others. This idea had its origins in
George Herbert Mead. Summarizing Mead, Abbott says, “[W]hile Mead succeeded admirably at showing
individual/society dualism, he did so that the price of removing all particularity.” Furthermore, he adds that “the
price of Mead’s merger of the individual and the social was the forfeiting of a truly temporal account of either the
individual or the social level, and more specifically of the emergence and fixation of differences at the social level.”
(Abbott 2016a:153-154). Abbott’s main critique of Mead is towards the abstractness of his theories: “Mead…
envisioned an abstract situation of interaction and theorized how such an abstract form of interaction could in
principle prove to be the origin of both the individual consciousness on the one hand and the set of general rules
constitutive of a social entity (the generalized other) on the other hand” (2009:151). Though he says it was an
improvement on the contractarian ideas of the time, based on “abstract individualism,” he says Meads position was
an abstract interactionism (151). This he says might have been because of the “polemical necessity” to speak
according to the legal vernacular of English and French contractarians, with “not only the contractarian logic but
also the mechanically associative psychology” (160) constraining the expression of his ideas. Lyrical sociology
would allow for the communication of experiences of concrete interaction, which is the only type of interaction that
there ‘really’ is.
18
Latour (2005:22) writes, “When sociologists of the social pronounce the words ‘society,’ ‘power,’ ‘structure,’ and
‘context,’ they often jump straight ahead to connect vast arrays of life and history, to mobilize gigantic forces, to
detect dramatic patterns emerging out of confusing interactions, to see everywhere in the cases at hand yet more
examples of well-known types, to reveal behind the scenes some dark powers pulling the strings.”
19
Or, as Levinas (1969:21) asserts, “Individuals are reduced to being bearers of forces that command them
unbeknown to themselves.”
16

17

This story is not the same as any possible collection of stories that a researcher gathers
from his or her fieldwork, interviews, surveys, or even their own personal experiences while
conducting these data gathering efforts. In fact, as mentioned previously, the best pieces of
lyrical sociology consist of such “purely momentary ‘stories’” (86). This story is the story that is
told in the analysis of the stories that are gathered or constructed. It is the story in the
sociological sense rather than in a literary one. 20 Abbott specifies further what he means when he
says he is against narrative, “This does not mean that [the lyric] cannot contain narrative
elements . . . But that its ultimate, framing structure should not be the telling of a story.” On the
flip side, Abbott tells that “many analyses that are conceived narratively have strongly lyrical
subsections” (2007a:73). Therefore, though lyrics can have elements of narrative and narratives
can have elements of the lyrical, it is this second order narrative, of narratizing the narratives (or
lyric), which Abbott argues against.
A good (or rather bad) example of this is seen in Abbott’s (2007a:77 footnote 17)
comments about Nicholas Christakis’s (1999) book on the dysfunctions of prognostication.
Although he praises the book for its profound lyricism, he notes that the last chapter—entitled
“A Duty to Prognosticate”—switches tone into moralizing narrative. The book is based off
dozens of interviews and hundreds of documents Christakis performed and gathered, which
include many stories de facto. Up until the last chapter, Abbott explains, Christakis simply tries
to bring the phenomenon of prognosticating to the forefront, “to show us how it makes him and
other physicians feel: confused, tentative, threatened, but also curiously and almost magically
Flyvbjerg (2006:238) tells how he avoids the reductive story-telling tendency in case study research: “First, when
writing up a case study, I demur from the role of omniscient narrator and summarizer. Instead, I tell the story in its
diversity, allowing the story to unfold from the many-sided, complex, and sometimes conflicting stories that the
actors in the case have told me. Second, I avoid linking the case with the theories of any one academic
specialization. Instead I relate the case to broader philosophical positions that cut across specializations. In this way
I try to leave scope for readers of different backgrounds to make different interpretations and draw diverse
conclusions regarding the question of what the case is a case of.”
20
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powerful” (2007a:77). The last chapter on the duty to prognosticate, though, Christakis
moralizes, or summarizes what is to be learned, from all the previous (lyrical) chapters,
retroactively risking the narratization of everything that had hitherto been lyrical—as if it had all
only been written to this end. This is what I mean by narratizing the narrative (or lyric). 21
The emotional and ethical power of Christakis’s book comes from the stories throughout
rather than the (moralizing) story he tells about them at the end. As the reviewer of his book
quoted before—Daniel Moerman (2001:133)—also wrote, “[T]he book is not about the ordinary
matters of this disease or that, this drug or that. It is much less about medicine than about metamedicine, an account of how medicine is practiced and why.” 22 The power of focusing on
particular people, places, and times—as ends in themselves rather than as means to larger cosmic
or structural narratives—is that by so doing you bring a dimension into the writing that
transcends any narrative reading that could be offered (Abbott 2007a:83). The problem is that
many of us still read with “narratively conditioned Western eyes” (74) and look for overarching
themes, lessons, or explanations. 23 It is work like Abbotts (and mine I hope) that help to bring
about different ways of imagining the immense value of “‘small’ things” (80). 24

As I will discuss in chapter 3, this narratization risks foreclosing on the uniquely lyrical result of the study.
By “why,” Moerman most likely means “why” in terms of the doctor’s personal motivations (i.e. their passionate
reason for being a doctor) rather than the functional reasons for why medicine is practiced in general. Christakis’s
book clearly fits with the former.
23
A softer approach would be to hint at, suggest, or lead one to believe rather than to tell an outright causal story
between small and large things (Abbott 2007a:80). Yet, though as preferable as this might even be, this is still not
the primary purpose of the lyric (see note 14 on Reed and Bell).
24
As seen in the three previous examples (grounded theory, extended case method, and autoethnography), noticing
the connection between the self and society is at the core of sociological thinking, all the way from C. Wright Mills’
‘sociological imagination’, where the “vivid awareness of the relationship between experience and the wider
society” (Mills 1959) is said to be paramount to any study of either private or public life. Abbott isn’t denying that
this association exists. He’s only questioning the way it is said to exist, and the conclusions derived therein. He
would agree with Roth (2005:3), who believes that “the individual and its society… mutually presuppose one
another,” but would argue that “they do so not under abstract but under very particular circumstances” (Abbott
2016a:163). Abbott says that this admittedly “makes their mutual interdependence so difficult to theorize,” but that
to try and do so is also is what makes it “so worthwhile” (163).
21
22

19

Though many methodological approaches employed today (even qualitative ones) are put
to use in very narrative ways, parts of the approaches though, such as induction (as in grounded
theory), deduction (as in the extended case method), and the allowance for the subjectivity of the
author (as in autoethnography), are not inherently narrative activities on their own. They have
their part in lyrical sociology as well and are, in fact, quite natural processes for anyone who
thinks seriously about the social world. The problem comes in the way these methods try and
justify themselves. They try to beat quantitative approaches, which are almost always geared
toward explanation, at their own game, suggesting perhaps that ‘micro is the new macro’, that
specific instances are the best way to get at broader questions. But, in the process, they miss out
on other potential viable contributions, one’s that aren’t as easy to justify, or quantify, because in
many ways their justifications lie outside what mainstream sociology deems valuable, and
capable of measuring.
I will elaborate upon these unique benefits of lyrical sociology in the following chapters.
In the next section though, I want to continue my discussion on what the lyric might have to say
about other social scientific methodologies by turning to an examination of the specific criteria
that makes a piece of lyrical sociology precisely what it is, an assertion against narrative (Abbott
2007a:73). By being an assertion against narrative, lyrical sociology cannot simply be against it
in the negative sense that it is only not-narrative. Pieces that are purely descriptive (as some
accuse lyrical sociology and other qualitatively inclined methodologies to be), which refrain
from explanation, could rightfully fall into this category. However, lyrical sociology is more than
this. It aims to do something beyond just description (especially in a detached and objective
way). It has a telos (though quite different from that of narrative). And, it is more than just an
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absence. If anything, lyrical sociology is not the absence of narrative, but narrative is the absence
of lyric. 25
Methodological Implications: Criteria for Lyrical Sociology
Abbott gives specific criteria to judge lyrical from non-lyrical works, which depend
mostly on the writer’s stance toward the world he or she writes about and the reader. I will
discuss the stance in detail in the next chapter. Here I draw upon three main parts of it though for
a lyrical writer—that they be emotionally engaged (in the right way), subjectively located
(placed in a specific “here”), and temporally present (part of a specific moment in time, an
indexical “now”)—in order to elaborate on how lyrical sociology fits in with questions of
methodology. Abbott refers to various works that meet any one of eight different combinations
of these three criteria of the stance (see table 1). For a piece to be lyrical it must meet all three.
By knowing the exact conditions for lyrical works, it helps to provide both a rubric by which to
know lyrical sociology when you see it as well as suggest a blueprint for constructing one’s own
lyrical texts. It allows for more flexibility in one’s methodological approach(es) since, as we will
see, the lyrical stance isn’t strictly limited to one or a few choice methodologies (though it is
seemingly more suited for some), as well is not a methodology itself. It is more than a
methodology, but a way we, as methodologists, relate to the world our methods help us to
discover and construct.
(Table 1 about here)
For example, Abbott tells how ethnographic methods share important qualities with
lyrical sociology, to the extent that one could almost consider them synonyms. “It is written by a

Michael Bell (2011:22) writes, “Total explanation can only survive through its rituals of avoidance of the
messiness, contradiction, incommensurability, motion, surprise, and originality that seem so evident and relevant in
the everyday life and concerns of the social actor.”
25
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particular person. Since it involves being somewhere, it is usually about a moment. And it often
embodies intense personal engagement. So it meets the three basic requisites of the lyrical stance
by its very nature” (2007a:86). However, as Abbott shows, this conclusion does not necessarily
hold true in either direction of comparison. All ethnography is not lyrical nor is all lyrical
sociology purely ethnography. The truth is more nuanced, and exciting.
First, he writes, “The engagement of an ethnographer need not be a direct and emotional
one” (86). Abbott tells how the British social anthropologist Edmund Leach (1954) rigorously
combined both his ethnographic knowledge (primarily from his time serving in the Burma army)
with a vast amount of other published research on the hill tribes of Burma, but that his work
“lack[ed] any authorial emotion other than a withering sarcasm directed at structural-functional
colleagues” (Abbott 2007a:87). Secondly, Abbott observes, “[M]odern ethnography is not
necessarily about moments or places” (87). He points out that ethnographers often either embed
their fieldwork in “larger historical flow[s]” or in “larger regional or social structure[s]” (87),
which removes them from the indexical present and place required of the lyrical stance. 26
Therefore, all three criteria that ethnography and lyrical sociology would seem to align on
naturally, can become misaligned in any or all of the ways mentioned.
Now to the reverse point that all lyrical sociology need not be pure ethnography. Abbott
writes, “imagine—on the basis of theoretical argument—how a lyrical impulse might express
itself in historical sociology or quantitative sociology as well.” He gives Nicholas Christakis’s
work as a case in point of the latter, calling it, somewhat amusingly, “real sociology—hard-core

Abbott (2007a:85) says that certain approaches to sociology, such as historical sociology, are written beautifully
and “hence ‘lyrical’ in the lay sense” but not in the “technical sense” if they do not situate themselves within a
distinctly non-narrative temporal framework. The same could be said of place.
26
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quantitative analysis combined with endless, almost obsessed interviewing” (77). 27 Like
Zorbaugh, Christakis brings methodological rigor to his research that enhances, rather than
detracts, from the book’s lyricality. The quantitative side of it no doubt must be coupled with
other non-quantitative factors—such as the fact that Christakis himself is a physician and was
thus intimately engaged with the study’s topic and its eventual audience—in order for it to be a
successful lyric. Therefore, to extend the propositional logic of the lyric/ethnography relation, I
would argue that not all lyrical ethnography needs to be quantitative, but that all lyrical
quantitative work should probably have an ethnographic dimension, even if it is simply a
personal experience with the topic in another setting that has helped to sensitize and enliven the
researcher to the issue or issues under study. This is perhaps the even deeper layer than makes
Christakis’s book so lyrical.
On the dedication page to his book, Christakis (1999) tells how when he was six years
old, his mother was given a 10 percent chance of living longer than three weeks. Fortunately, he
says that she ended up living for nineteen more years, but that this error in prognostication
proved to have more far-reaching consequences for him than he could have ever foreseen. He
writes, “I spent my boyhood always fearing that her lifelong chemotherapy would stop working,
constantly wondering whether my mother would live or die, and both craving and detesting
prognostic precision. This ambivalence did not change when I became a physician myself.”
Abbott says that Christakis’s “overarching lyrical stance is struck on the dedication page;” the
“damnable ambivalence he himself feels as a practicing physician” (2007a:77) is presumably the

Abbott (2007a:77) writes that “Christakis’s book shows that lyrical writing in my sense—writing whose chief
intent is to convey a particular author’s emotional relation to a certain kind of social moment—is quite possible even
in predominantly quantitative work. The book thus illustrates not only the anti-narrative character of lyrical
sociology, but also its insistence on the communication of passion, even at the possible expense of abstract
representation of reality.”
27
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very ambivalence that he carried in from his childhood. It is what makes his treatment of the
topic so sweeping, so moving, so real to life, so lyrical.
Christakis is not the first one to have multiple points of contact for his specific academic
interest. As a counter to Christakis’s very personal book, Abbott tells of Scott Snook’s
monograph, Friendly Fire (2000), that documents the events leading up to the 1994 shoot down
of two United States Army helicopters over northern Iraq by two United States Air Force fighter
jets in an incident of friendly fire (misidentifying them as Iraqi helicopters), killing all 26
military and civilian peacekeepers aboard. Snook, like Christakis, has both a professional and
personal motivation for writing his book, being both a military-man himself for almost twenty
years as well as also having been the victim of friendly fire during his service. However, as
Abbott states, “In a setting that is an invitation to lyricism, this author with every right to wax
lyrical about how humans experience chance and intention and meaning simply refuses to
deviate from his narrative path” (2007a:78). He rather dispassionately analyzes all the antecedent
events that eventuated in the tragic shootdown and focuses only on “the causal question at hand:
How did this happen?” (78). 28 Though his conclusion is rather fascinating (and disturbing)—that
as oxymoronic as it sounds, the shootdown was a “normal accident” (see Perrow 1984)—the
resulting book is “relentlessly mimetic and artificial” rather than “passionate and naturalistic”
(Abbott 2007a:77). Thus, a personal connection to a research question does not necessarily lead
to emotional engagement; and likewise, I would add, you do not need such a drastic

Alternative approaches and questions Abbott (2007a:78) proposes, that supposedly would lead to greater lyrical
insight, would have included looking at the “agonizing side of this event—the remorse of the pilots, the
shamefacedness of the Air Force, the ‘what happened to everyone after the fact’ . . . We never even find out how the
shootdown was identified as a friendly shootdown, how the news spread within a day to the Secretary of Defense, or
what the initial reactions were.” All of these angles could have added a lyrical element to the book and perhaps
existed alongside the explanatory questions he mostly explores. Though, for it to be lyrical, the explanatory
questions and concerns would have to take a secondary role to these others.
28
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autobiographical impetus for becoming affectively engaged either. You merely need an entry
point, small or large, and the courage and ability to walk through it.
Even if Snook allowed himself to be more emotionally engaged throughout the book, his
overall analysis is still constructed in a temporally narrative and explanatory fashion and would
therefore have to be rethought in order for his work to be considered lyrical in the sense that
Abbott describes. Other authors Abbott cites meet varying conditions of the lyrical stance.
Massey and Denton (1993) are emotionally engaged about the topic of segregation (though in a
non-lyrical or moralistic way) but are not temporally (or subjectively) located. Fleck ([1935]
1979) is temporally focused on the lyrical moment of science in the study of syphilis but is not
sufficiently engaged emotionally to be counted as lyrical. And, Riesman (1950)’s The Lonely
Crowd is exceptionally subjective—indeed, Abbott writes that “[o]ne comes away from it with a
very strong sense indeed of David Riesman as a person: a reflective moralizer located
somewhere between bemused geniality, conservative reaction, and visionary critique”—but
never does he let his emotions “overmaster him” to create a “stabbing sense of the humane”
(Abbott 2007a:75). All these authors meet some of the criteria of the lyrical stance, but not
others, and therefore each fall short of the lyrical designation. 29
A final consideration in evaluating and understanding what makes a lyrical work lyrical,
and how a lyrical approach transcends methodology, is elaborating further upon the one
requirement of the author to be emotionally engaged. In the preceding paragraphs where I
discussed the three components of the lyrical stance in relation to various approaches, I put

Though each of these required aspects of lyricism exist on a continuum, to judge a works lyricality by averaging
them could be misleading. Each has a threshold of its own and its only if the individual threshold of one of the
specific criteria is surpassed can the evaluation of the pieces lyricalness continue. It’s like taking three classes during
a semester that are all pass/fail, wherein you can only advance onto the next grade if you pass all three (not just if
your averages in all the classes combined equal up to a passing score).
29
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parenthetical comments after discussing writers who were indeed emotionally engaged in order
to qualify what was meant by this engagement. The proper emotional engagement, as far as
Abbott explains explicitly, is best described in the positive perhaps as a lyrical one. For example,
Abbott tells how although Marx often wears his emotions on his sleeves— of “seething anger
and a thoroughgoing contempt”—they are “moralizing emotions, not lyrical ones” (2007a:85
footnote 22). But, this doesn’t help all that much in specifying the unique emotional engagement
of a lyrical sociologist, because it uses the very terms it is describing to describe itself. The other
hint that Abbott gives is what the engagement is not; the emotional engagement is not a
moralizing relationship where the author speaks down a series of oughts inferred from their
series of is’s, or findings (or previously held beliefs and assumptions). 30
There is no room in the lyrical stance for prescribing actionable policies, regulations,
ethical codes, or activist agendas, or at least not for centering upon these purposes. However, this
is not to say that the lyrical engagement wouldn’t or couldn’t affect all of these aims. 31 The
word, and distinction, that I would put forth is that the lyrical stance of emotional engagement is
an ethical relation between concrete individuals, rather than an abstract moralizing one or an
unspecified “emotional relation” (Abbott 2007a:77, 92). As McDonald (2008:19) describes the
difference:
Traditionally, morality has been characterized as the rules and conventions used to guide
a person’s conduct or behavior, such rules and conventions having reference to a
“rationality” whose crucial if not defining feature is, as in the case of Kant’s “categorical

He calls this emotional engagement an expression of “nonmoral emotions” (Abbott 2007a:82). But again, this
doesn’t do anything to affirm what lyrical sociology is.
31
Attridge (2017:178) writes that “the special value of a non-moral discourse of ethics is that it can provide insights
into the fundamental conditions of the moral-political domain, the world of rules, programs, categories, without
being reduced to them.”
30
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imperative,” its universality. “Ethics,” by contrast, connotes the more personalized, less
universal and consequently less rigorously rationalizable aspects of our moral interaction
with others in the world.
Morality, as an ethical system, is rationalizable and narratizable. Ethics, as a personalized
(though not subjective) relation, resists rationalization and is lyrical. Though Abbott doesn’t
himself use this specific terminology of the ethical (as opposed to the moral), it would have been
(and will be) helpful throughout to plainly distinguish the specific type of emotional relation for
which he advocates.
Lyrical writers must therefore be all of these things at once: ethically and emotionally
engaged with their work and research questions, subjectively located within the world they both
write about and are a part of, and, likewise, temporally present in these same worlds. If they
neglect entirely or lack considerably in any one of these areas, their work becomes like all other
forms of narrative sociology, primarily geared toward explanation rather than emotional
evocation and ethical transformation. This has broad implications for how we think about the
way lyrical sociology fits in with other social scientific methodologies or approaches. It is not a
new methodology with radically new tools for data collection and analysis, besides perhaps those
used in the presentation of such data and the thinking through of it—though, in reality, these
have existed in many classical sociological texts and outside of the discipline for centuries. Nor
is it a mere linguistic approach centered solely on more tentative and honest ways of explaining
the social in contrast to the overly confident language of causality exhibited in narrative forms of
research—though it does perhaps have this feature. Lyrical sociology is a more general approach
to the research process that guides methodological considerations rather than just another
methodology one could or could not choose to use depending on the question at hand.
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To reduce lyrical sociology to ethnography, autoethnography, literature, participant
observation, “just description,” “mere journalism” (2007a:96), or “popular writing” would,
Abbott says, “short circuit a more serious consideration” (73). All of these approaches, and more
(such as quantitative studies, case methods, comparative-historical research, ethnomethodology /
conversation analysis, visual studies, archival and textual analysis, etc.), can be conceived
lyrically or non-lyrically. 32 Lyrical sociology is therefore more than a methodology. It is a metamethodology, a “rhetorical form” (85), that transcends, even as it competes with, narrative
modes of research and report. In the next chapter, I will look at the three facets of the lyrical
stance discussed here in greater detail—as well as the mechanics or literary devices employed in
the construction of lyrical texts. By fleshing out the rudimentary principles of what makes lyrical
sociology distinct, we will be better equipped to not only recognize it but use it too.

I don’t have the space here to show how each of these approaches could take on a lyrical or narrative form. Visual
sociology, and even photography in general, seems close to the lyrical approach in its use of images (actual rather
than verbally created). However, images can be used to explain and tell a story and/or a moral (even if a work is just
one image) or they can be used lyrically to juxtapose different people, places, and times in such as to elicit an
emotional and ethical response that transcends whatever argument could be made.
32
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CHAPTER 2: STANCE AND MECHANICS OF WRITER
Abbott outlines his formal theory of the lyric under two main categories: stance and
mechanics. He defines stance as, “an author’s attitude toward what he or she writes and toward
his or her audience” and the mechanics as the “devices an author uses in constructing his or her
text” (2007a:73). Of the two, Abbott says that the stance is more important. It is at the “heart of
the lyrical impulse” (73) and is from where the “chief mechanical differences between a lyrical
and a narrative sociology stem” (76). Thus, I will address the question of the lyrical stance first
before proceeding to a discussion of the mechanics. In both sections, I will not only summarize
what Abbott says, but also suggest points beyond his thinking, most significantly in the direction
of ethics.
As mentioned previously, Abbott draws extensively upon literary theory in order to flesh
out his theory of lyrical sociology. However, there are many schools of criticism within the field:
historical criticism, formalism and new criticism, structuralism, deconstruction and poststructuralism, Marxism and critical theory, new historicism and cultural poetics, and readerresponse criticism, to name a few. Though Abbott doesn’t explicitly align himself with any
specific school of thought, besides equating structuralism with narrative (2007a:70) and relying
upon Paul de Man (83-85), a deconstructivist, to flesh out some of the nuances of his theory, I
will, in pointing to ethics, draw upon the burgeoning field of ethical criticism to suggest the
ethical potential of lyrical sociology.
Within the field of ethical criticism, there are a variety of approaches as well. I focus on a
Levinas inspired version whose method of criticism, much like the lyric, transcends method, or
at least cannot be reduced to it. Eaglestone (1997:165), a literary theorist who follows in this
tradition, argues, “There cannot be a Levinasian ethical criticism per se, because as soon as a
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way of reading becomes a methodology, an orthodoxy or a totalizing system, it loses its ability to
interrupt, to fracture the said” (emphasis in original). By fracturing the said, he means the ability
of the irreducible person of the other, as either research subject or writer, to speak through
whatever literal meaning a text could be said to have. In terms of lyrical sociology, this means
that the theory of the lyric itself will always be evolving and irreducible to a single delineable
approach. Nevertheless, though it is a “necessary impoverishment” (Faulconer 2005:54), the
theory of the lyric is a something rather than a nothing. It is an inexhaustible alternative to
narrative by this very inexhaustibility. I now turn to its main features—its stance and
mechanics—all the while throughout weaving a discussion of ethics inspired by Levinas and
Levinasian thinkers.
Stance: Writer
The stance of the lyrical writer is a relational one and finds itself at the core of Abbott’s
thinking about lyrical sociology. The writer has “a specific emotional relation toward both
audience and material,” Abbott writes (2007a:92). This comes out in both the tone they use in
directing their remarks to some future reader and in the feelings that they both have and convey
toward the world they study (73-74). In this section, I want to look at the lyrical stance along the
three dimensions I drew upon in the last chapter: emotionally engaged (in a lyrical way),
subjectively located, and temporally present. I will argue, though, that the emotional relation
Abbott envisions, which is necessarily tied up in the specific spatial and temporal position of the
writer, is better thought of as an ethical one, and that this can be inferred from examples in
Abbott’s own text.
Emotional Engagement
Abbott writes that the lyric involves “an intense participation in the object studied, which
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the writer wants to recreate for the reader” (74). Like the example of Christakis discussed
previously, the writer must be intimately involved in their research question and have a stake in
whatever answer or answers they find, if there be any. They are “not unwilling to be seen
wrestling with [their] data, to be seen confused and hesitant” (75), because the value of their
research is “less in the conclusions, than in the mode of arriving at them” (Mill 1977:168; quoted
in Swedberg 2012). The writer lets the reader in on the ground floor of the research process
before everything is packaged neatly and sent off to the lab for hypothesis testing. The reader can
only feel the writer’s level of intensity when they are given this kind of access.
Abbott believes that the writer is a facilitator of the relationship between the studied
object and the reader. However, their intermediary role is not distanced or ironic, as if the writer
merely introduced the two and then left the room (Abbott 2007a:74). 33 They stay close—very
close—poking and prodding each to get them to reveal more and more in cycles of endless
(self)disclosure and cloture. Throughout, the writer makes themselves vulnerable as well. The
relationship between writer and reader (and world) is founded on the utmost sincerity. If, by
chance, there is “an irony to the lyricism,” Abbot writes, “it is an irony shared with the object
and the reader, not an irony that positions the writer outside the experience of investigation and
report” (74). The writer isn’t just a passive medium who transmits the world to the reader
without interfering, but is, at all times, engaged with both.
This relentless engagement with both object and reader helps the reader to connect
emotionally—and ethically—to both the world they read about and the world they themselves
are a part of. The reader feels something when they read that they can’t quite discern (like the
reviewers of Bell’s Childerly and Christakis’ Death Foretold), but experience as a call. Literary
Abbott (2007a:74) remarks how “it is a commonplace of sociology today that engagement with one’s topic is not
‘scientific,’ as if distance and irony were the only legitimate stance for sociological writing.”
33

31

theorist Charles Altieri (1998:293) writes that:
Aesthetic emotion may even be considered a strange kind of affect because it tends not to
be focussed on any particulars within the work but to characterize the force by which we
respond to the piece as a whole, as if we were willing to take responsibility for who we
became by virtue of our participation in it. 34
To invoke the popular, but true, phrasing, ‘With great power comes great responsibility’ (Uncle
Ben). Emotionally evocative texts have power to pull the reader into a state of mind that is quite
different from normal social scientific writing, as well as make demands upon them that cannot
be reduced to the works content alone. It is a combination of both stasis and kinesis, of both
engaged rumination and active receptivity in the form of a response (Richardson & Lockridge
1998:328-330; see also Brinkmann 2009b). Moreover, these aesthetic dimensions, and the
responses they engender, are thought of as being “one and the same” with ethics (Wittgenstein
1974:86; see also note 13 in Altieri 1998:297). However, this can be either problematic or
desirable, depending on the level of actual engagement of writer and reader.
Conflating aesthetics and ethics often results in the stance of the former becoming the
stance of the latter. In the context of Levinas’s rather pessimistic view on art, Craig (2010:182)
comments, “Levinas is highly sensitive to the dangers of making ethics aesthetic-as if ethics
were something from which one might disengage, or gawk at from a distance.” Levinas
rightfully saw art as potentially reductive of the real and immediate ethical relations that
undergird social life. However, Craig adds, “But there is an even greater danger in leaving ethics
without any emotional impact . . . [and] producing a theory that bears no connection with the
living feel and unsystematic complexity of life” (Craig 2010:182). Art and ethics need each
Wilkes (2009:1) writes how “artistic expression can open communication between the self and the Other, allowing
the viewer or reader to accept responsibility for the act of witnessing the artist’s representation.”
34
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other.
Non-artistic, or “scientific,” approaches can of course be equally as reductive as artistic
ones. And, in many instances, artistic works arise in response to these overly reductionistic
depictions of reality. However, if the writer or reader is not careful, they can get so caught up in
the artistic experience that they actually lose their bearings in the real. Van Manen (2002:238)
writes how experiencing emotion can be a sign that a researcher has achieved the type of
engagement necessary for the proper transmission of social experience but that “there is always
the danger that we are merely enchanted by the superficial haunt of shallow sentimentality or
catchy formulations; that is why it is good practice to check again the effect of the text several
days after writing it.” Because lyrical sociology is about the moment, the writer must stay in it in
order to appropriately convey it, rather than get lost in it.35
Abbott cautions against two particular emotions that pull a writer out of the lyrical mode
and moment: outrage and nostalgia. Both, he writes, “far from finding something magical and
special in the indexical here and now, judge the here and now to be wanting by comparison with
this other idealized state” (2007a:93)—or abstract there and then. While outrage envisions an
idealized other present that the current “here” lacks (such as a state of equality), nostalgia
imagined a golden past, which the current “now” does not have either. 36 Both are therefore
“comparative emotion[s]” (93) and involve two distinct locations each—outrage spatially and
nostalgia temporally. The one location is a real one—a real indexical here or now—and the other
is a non-location referred to simply as an “elsewhere” (93).
Abbott (2007a:96) writes, “There is a place in social science for writing that conveys an author’s emotional
apprehension of social moments, that does this within the framework of rigor and investigative detachment that we
all consider the precondition of our work as social scientists.” Just as it is possible to overthink a certain situation,
researchers can also over-feel them too. A focus on concrete others, and one’s responsibility toward them, helps to
prevent extremes of reductive thinking or feeling.
36
Abbott (2007a:93) identifies progressivism as the reverse of nostalgia but says that it is equally as narrative and
comparative.
35
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The problem with both these emotions—outrage (often in a moralizing form) rooted in
anger and nostalgia rooted in sadness—is that they aim “not to awaken in the reader an
emotional state but rather a desire for action” (93), 37 making them moral or political emotions
rather than truly ethical ones. This is when conflating aesthetics and ethics becomes problematic.
Lyrical emotions, which I am arguing are synonymous with ethical ones, are grounded in a
particular author’s experiences of real people in real times and real places, while non-lyrical, or
narrative, emotions pit the “particular experiences of individuals in tension with dominant
expressions of discursive power” (Neumann 1996:189). The difference is that one maintains its
focus on the ethical encounter of concrete actors while the other shifts into moralizing about the
distance between is and ought. Abbott therefore argues for a sociology of non-advocacy,
“interested in understanding the social world (as a value enterprise) rather than in changing it”
(Abbott 2007b:204). 38 In this way, ethics can be separated from the moral and the political.
This ethical impulse seems to be what underlies Abbott’s specific way of identifying
lyrical works from non-lyrical ones. For Marx, his emotions were moralizing rather than lyrical
because his portrayal of the evil done by the wealthy to the poor was primarily to advance his
moral position on the rich rather than to express his “feelings towards the poor. . . . The
importance of famine dead,” Abbott writes, “is for Marx’s argument, not for themselves as

Dromi and Illouz (2010:19) believe that to galvanize the reader into making some sort of action-based
commitment is, in fact, the best reason why one should involve themselves emotionally in a text. They write,
“Making oneself present in the text of an argument, a literary work, or another form of artistic expression by letting
the audience know how one feels becomes a means of expressing one’s moral sense, in the hope of moving others
toward a commitment.” Abbott would argue that this kind of emotional engagement is actually more political than
moral (in the true sense that I am calling ethics) and advocates instead for the place of “nonmoral emotions”
(2007a:82) in sociology. In fact, he believes that this is what made the most admired works in sociology what they
were; and that today, “perhaps it is not so much our moral timidity and our obsession with professionalism, as
Burawoy (2005) has argued [in his piece on Public Sociology], but rather our colorless imaginations and our
plodding moralism that have driven sociology from the public stage” (Abbott 2007a:72).
38
This overlaps in important ways with a Weberian value-sphere approach and his idea of an “ethics of
responsibility” (Starr 1999).
37
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human beings” (2007a:85). Likewise, regarding Snook, Abbott emphasizes the warrant for his
book comes from the “human consequence of 26 unexpected deaths” (78) rather than from the
rarity of the event itself, though this is hardly underscored in the book. And, with Riesman, his
fault was that he never arrived at a level of lyricism required to create a “stabbing sense of the
humane” (75).
Abbott’s concerns are existential and ethical. The best lyrical sociologists focus on
questions that transcend the situations they are in (77). 39 This transcendence, though, occurs
through engagement rather than detachment, through lyrical emotions (such as “humane
sympathy” or the “sublime”) rather than narrative ones, and through ethical motivations rather
than moralistic or political ones. Such a stance, in Abbott’s view, is “our best hope for a
humanist sociology, one that can be profoundly moral without being political” (96). It is a type
of sociology that is “moral without being ‘moralistic’” (Fowers and Tjeltveit 2013:390) and is
therefore, of necessity, not narrative, since “narrative cannot be other than moralizing” (Abbott
2007a:72). It is, in short, a lyrical sociology.
Subjective Location
As the previous section details, the writer’s subjective “here” and “now” matters
significantly for the type of emotional experience they have and the relationship this establishes
with the reader. Abbott writes how, “The lyrical impulse is located in a particular consciousness,
that of a particular writer who is in a particular place” (2007a:74). However, unlike traditional
sociological methods, which try to limit or hide this subjectivity, in the lyrical approach,
subjectivity is conspicuous. The lyrical writer is always aware of his or her self as more than just

Concerning Christakis’ book, Abbott (2007a:77) describe the tension that always ensues in a prognostic situation
with “the imponderability of an outcome that will be probabilistic for the doctor, but deterministic for the patient,
who will either live or die.” And that, “Seen this way, as an asymmetric situation that opposes probability and
determination, the prognostic situation far transcends medicine.”
39
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a recording device, “but as the person whose emotional experience of a social world is at the
heart of his or her writing” (74). The text that proceeds from them bears their own personal
signature. They are implicated in it and by it, as it is both a window into the social world as seen
by and through them, and thus a window into their own souls too. The lyrical work of a
subjectively located writer is therefore incapable of being morally neutral. It always makes
claims about the social world anchored in critically self-reflective “strong evaluations” (Taylor
1976:282). 40
The sources of these evaluations and emotional reactions are their own pre-judgments (or
prejudices), the a priori understandings, beliefs, and attitudes they carry into the world they
experience. Lopate, the author of The Art of the Personal Essay—which genre has many
important points of overlap with the lyric—describes how essayists deal with these prejudgements in their writing:
The essayist is someone who lives with the guilty knowledge that he is "prejudiced". . .
and has a strong predisposition for or against certain everyday phenomena. It then
becomes his business to attend to these inner signals, these stomach growls, these
seemingly in-defensible intuitions, and try to analyze what lies underneath them, the
better to judge them (1995:xxxi).
The form of the writing, whether of the lyric or the essay, is a process for judging one’s
judgments (both a priori and a posteriori) and is, in this way, itself a judgment. However, Lopate
adds, quoting Georg Lukács ([1911] 2010:34), “the essential, the value-determining thing about

In strong evaluations, “desires are classified in such categories as higher or lower virtuous or vicious, more or less
fulfilling, more or less refined, profound or superficial, noble or base; where they are judged as belonging to
different modes of life, fragmented or integrated, alienated or free, saintly or merely human, courageous or
pusillanimous, and so on.” They are compared to weak evaluations, where actions are weighed “simply to determine
convenience, or how to make different desires compossible – he might resolve to put off eating although hungry,
because later he could both eat and swim – or how to get the overall satisfaction” (Taylor 1976:282).
40
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it is not the verdict… but the process of judging” (Lopate 1995:xxxi). The way the writer sees
the world—and writes about it—is just as important as the world they see. Or, as Abbott
(2007a:76) puts it, “Lyricism lies in its approach to these things, not in the things themselves.”
Since all seeing is perspectival, there is no “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) 41 and no
way to escape the subjective position of the writer or the inevitably ethical (or unethical) choices
they make as human agents when constructing their texts. An artist, like a scientist, cannot
merely represent the world non-perspectivally, or non-evaluatively. Nor can they represent it
non-reflexively, at least if they are being honest (and ethical) about their representations. As
Anderson (1996:18) writes, “To engage in strong evaluation, then, is to grapple with the question
of whether one wants to be the sort of person who is moved in the way one finds oneself being
moved.” As the text becomes a mechanism for judging one’s own judgements, the lyrical writer
finds themselves ethically responsible within a world they write about and within a world they
write to, to both an object and a reader.
Temporal Presentness
Abbott emphasizes that a lyrical sociology is always located in time. He writes how the
lyrical writer “consciously create[s] the image of a world in a moment, a snapshot of another
world in being, even as that world changed” (2007a:75). The ontological fact of the world for a
lyricist is that the world is dynamic and changing. 42 To capture this though, contrary to what is
conventionally held to be more rigorous methodology (longitudinal as opposed to cross-sectional
research), the lyrical cross-section of a moment in time is neither static nor linear. Abbott writes
Abbott (2007a:91 footnote 36) calls this the “dimensional view” rather than the indexical one. For an interesting
discussion on how anti-colonialist projects paradoxically created a different type of “view from nowhere” in the
very process of trying to abolish it see Abbott (2007a:91-92).
42
To reiterate the points made in the last section, the lyricist does not simply try and capture the dynamics of the
living and changing world, since they recognize that they themselves are always living in it and changing it too.
And, moreover, they give each person and situation they write about these privileges and responsibilities as well; for
that is how they see theirs and other’s subjectivity, as both a privilege and a responsibility.
41
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that, “To see a moment as complete in itself yet absolutely transitory is thus the foundation of the
lyric sensibility” (84). The lyrical lens focuses on the stillness of the turning world (84 footnote
20).
The way a moment is complete in itself is through processes of repetition, where entities
are conceived as being “events that keep happening in the same way” (Abbott 1995:873). The
way the moment is absolutely transitory is that its existence is always oriented toward death.
McDonald (2008:30), referencing Levinas, states, “The alterity of time can be accessed only by
means of the Moment, by means of that eternity of presentness which is an eternal repetition:
that impossibility of time which is the omnipresence of death.” The affirming of the present
moment is where the ethical quality of the lyric resides. As I foreshadowed in chapter one, the
only way to do justice to the pastness of the past is to focus on its indexical presentness. 43 This is
because, for Levinas, “death is always unjust and never natural”, yet it is also always a reality to
which “the moment’s evanescence, the radical alterity” of time itself testifies (McDonald
2008:30). Thus, the temporality of the lyric is both more just and humane in its obligation to the
present as well as truer to reality in its depiction of passing time. As Abbott (2007a:90) writes,
“In lyric, we hear the whisper of possibility and the sigh of passage.”
Humans are neither deterministically reducible or everlastingly reifiable. They remain
both infinite and finite at the same time, but all within (rather than outside) the time they live. In
narrative, Branigan (1992:4) writes, “some person, object, or situation undergoes a particular
type of change and this change is measured by a sequence of attributions which apply to the
thing at different times.” The emphasis on the change from moment to moment (i.e. the causal

Likewise, the same insights go for traveling through social space. Abbott (2007a:91) writes, “Lyrical sociology’s
sense of disposition is its spatial analogue of temporal passage. To the evanescent quality of ‘nowness’ in time it
adds an equivalent sense of the changing quality of ‘hereness’ as we move in social space, of what we might call not
evanescence but ‘intervanescence.’”
43
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link or sequence), rather than the moment itself, entails a singular story with “a beginning, a
middle, and an end, or as a model with independent, intervening, and dependent variables”
(Abbott 2007a:71). The longer or more global this change is, the more it can be “signified in the
overall relationships established among the totality of the elements (Branigan 1992:4) and not
through the irreducible quality of the individual parts.
A lyrical work is always more than the sum of its individual parts, or its set of moments
or stories, but at the same time it is inexorably dependent upon them as moments in themselves
for the emergent and irreducible features to which the reader responds. Iser (1978:16) notes that,
“Large-scale texts such as novels or epics cannot be continually ‘present’ to the reader with an
identical degree of intensity.” The ability of the lyric to remain “continually ‘present’” is what
makes the lyric an art (as in a difficult task) and is tied to the other two parts of the lyrical stance.
The lyricist must remain emotionally engaged and spatially located not “outside the situation but
in it” (Abbott 2007a:74) if they are to stay within time too. Just as there is no “view from
nowhere”, there is no view outside of time. The lyric, like life, is a judgement from the beginning
to end, not just in its final conclusion (if there be one). Levinas (1969:23) writes, “It is not the
last judgment that is decisive, but the judgment of all the instants in time, when the living are
judged.” Judgement, by which I mean the ethical evaluations of a particular writer (or reader),
therefore has a temporal dimension as well that is missing in narrative. 44
There is much more to say about each of the components of the lyrical stance. My
intention has been to not only re-present what Abbott has said concerning it, but to point to how
the stance, which he primarily sees as emotional, is ethical too. The way the writer relates to the

In narrative, the reader can only judge the writer on whether they agree with their conclusions based on the
evidence and reasons provided throughout the text. In a lyrical work, the reader’s question isn’t whether to agree or
disagree with the writer, but whether they themselves (the reader) are living right. They are being judged by their
reading of the text just as much as they are judging it.
44
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world, the reader, and their own here and now has drastic implications for the ability of their
writing to evoke legitimate ethical responses in readers. To add to this discussion, Abbott
mentions specific ways in which the writing of the text should proceed if this stance is to be
properly communicated.
Mechanics: Writer
I organize Abbott’s discussion of the lyrical mechanics around two main groups of
distinction: the difference between story and image and the difference between the theoretical,
moral, and emotional imagination. I also point to the techniques of figuration and personification
for lyrical writing in order to suggest a way to use language for purposes other than conveying
meaning, or simple feeling either. Like discussed with the lyrical stance, mechanics done right or
wrong has ethical implications.
The most important mechanical difference Abbott sees between narrative and lyric is
between story and image (2007a:76). While the former is aimed toward “recounting, explaining,
[and] comprehending,” the latter aims at using a “single image to communicate a mood, an
emotional sense of social reality” (73). The lyrical image is, more accurately, a bricolage made
up of “congeries of images” (76) that are selected, shaped by, and give shape to the impression
of a single image (Boswell and Corbett 2015). Northrop Frye (2002:35) writes how “[o]ur
impressions of human life are picked up one by one, and remain for most of us loose and
disorganized. But we constantly find things in literature that suddenly coordinate and bring into
focus a great many such impressions.” This is what the lyric does, when done right. It looks at
the complex, and often disorganized, image of a social situation—with all its quirks, caveats, and
contingencies—and “confronts us with our temporal and social spatial particularities in the very
process of showing us those of others” (Abbott 2007a:96). By doing so, it produces the unique
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emotion of “humane sympathy” (95) and a cohesive feeling-based sense of social reality.
Abbott, referencing Wordsworth, calls the ability to juxtapose strong images and evoke
powerful personal feelings, the “emotional imagination” and contrasts it to the theoretical and
moral imagination (Abbott 2007a:72; see also Jacobsen and Marshman 2008). Lopate
(1995:xxiv) tells how with the theoretical imagination’s factual or formal writing, “literary effect
is secondary to serious purpose” (from Holman and Harmon's 1992 A Handbook to Literature).
With both the moral and emotional imagination, obtaining a literary effect from the text is
crucial, if not the main rhetorical strategy. Though, as our discussion has shown, the effects are
different.
In lyrical sociology, as Abbott envisions it, the literary effect would necessarily need to
be specified further as the lyrical effect only (Brinkmann 2012:154). It would be an ethical effect
rather than a moralizing one. As Altieri (1998:3) writes, “Any adequate account of the ethical
force potential in literary experience needs to focus on states most clearly present in lyric
experience.” Other types of writing can yield “kinetic” responses, but lyrical writing is about
looking for a specific type of response that is ethical and humane. This is why Abbott warns
“lyrical sociology must be more than wonderful writing and literary bravura.” People can and do
confuse the emotional imagination with the moral imagination all the time in such stylistic texts.
Mechanics matter though in order to produce the appropriate lyrical effects. Though Wordsworth
would suggest that a crucial component to the emotional imagination is using informal “simple
terms, not jargon” (Abbott 2007a:72), the lyric is anything from aformal (without form). Abbott
writes that “Lyrical writing is as disciplined and formalized—perhaps more so—than other kinds
of writing” (73). There are specific ways to go about it, certain preconditions.
Two of these ways are using the techniques of personification and figurative language.
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Both, Abbott tells, are used to “give a striking image” and to convey both the “emotional tenor”
of the described social phenomenon and the writer’s own “powerful reaction” to it (82). For
example, Abbott starts his piece with an excerpt from Harvey Zorbaugh’s (1929) The Gold Coast
and the Slum where he compares the Chicago Loop to a heart, which “pump[s] in a ceaseless
stream the three millions of population of the city into and out of its central business district” (1).
With this image, wrought by metaphor, we can envision the daily dynamics of the city far better
than if we blandly stated the statistics of commuters within and out of the city. We also see
Zorbaugh’s emotional reaction to this part of the city, which Abbott identifies as astonishment
(2007a:74), through his use of the heart as the metaphor rather than something else (e.g.
comparing the city’s flux of people to the monotonous movements of worker ants in and out of a
mound).
With literal language a person means exactly what they say, but with figurative language
(such as metaphors and similes), what a person says is not exactly what they mean. Saying
something different than what one means is how a writer speaks through whatever thematic,
propositional, or literal meaning a text could be said to have. It is the only way in which an
emotional and ethical relation can be established with the reader, as opposed to a relation to a
commonly recognized narrative discourse—which would be a totalizing discourse of the said. 45
Thus, these linguistic techniques are a way to connect the reader with the writer and with the
world the writer writes about. As the writer employs them, and comes to the writing with the
proper emotional, spatial, and temporal stance, they will be able to awaken in the reader the same
feelings and sensitivities that enliven them, with the ultimate effect being the transmission of
ethical responsibility in the form of a call. This occurs in a particular way, as Attridge (2017:181)

45

This has potential overlaps with Levinas’s conception of the “saying” and the “said” (Levinas [1974] 1998).
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describes:
The distinctive ethical demand made by the literary work is not to be identified with its
characters or its plot, with the human intercourse and judgments it portrays, with its
depictions of virtues and vices or of the difficulty of separating these; all these can be
found in other discourses, such as historical writing or journalistic reporting. It is not a
question of literature’s capacity to provide a moral education; that too is a property it
shares with other kinds of writing. Rather, it is to be found in what makes it literature: its
staging of the fundamental processes whereby language works upon us and upon the
world.
The invitation into an emotional and ethical relation with the writer, and studied object, comes to
the reader through a text that has been fashioned in a way as to allow it. The next chapter will
look at the role of the reader in receiving all of what a well-constructed lyrical sociology has to
offer.
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CHAPTER 3: STANCE AND MECHANICS OF READER
This chapter examines the role of the reader in reading lyrical works. Bruner (1993:40)
writes about the potential truth available in autobiography: “The ‘rightness’ of any
autobiographical version is relative to the intentions and conventions that govern its construction
or its interpretation.” This can be said of the lyrical approach, and whatever mode of writing
really. The ‘intentions’ (stance) and ‘conventions’ (mechanics) of the writer and reader have the
power to reveal or obscure the ‘truth,’ or lyrical and ethical experience of a piece, inasmuch as
they are or are not followed. There are certain rules and prerequisites that the writer and reader
either must be aware of and adhere to—or do naturally—if they are to successfully realize and
receive the full potential of a lyrical work.
Foundational among these prerequisites regard the relationship between the writer and
reader. As the adage goes, ‘It’s not what you say but how you say it that matters most.’ Whereas
Abbott discusses tone mostly in terms of the writer, as part of the stance or attitude he or she
takes towards the reader (Abbott 2007a:74), in this chapter, I discuss it in terms of the reader and
the stance or attitude he or she takes towards the writer: ‘It’s not (just) what you read but how
you read that matters.’ And this tone of “how you read” also entails certain mechanics of its own
as well. I start with looking at the reader’s stance and how it can evolve through ones reading
(and rereading) of a text and then turn to an examination of the actual mechanics of reading
lyrical texts, and how they differ from other types of social scientific reading.
Stance: Reader
Like in the previous chapter’s section on the stance of the writer, I will argue that reading
lyrically is more than just an “emotional relation” that the reader has toward the writer (in this
case) and the text (or the what or who the text is about), but the stance is inherently an ethical
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relation all the way through. I start by discussing how the ethical proceeds the ontological and
objective knowledge through experience, then discuss the commitment of the reader to
converting to the writer’s way of thinking, and finish by discussing different readers responses to
lyrical works and offer some thoughts on how to be sure one is responding in the right way.
Commenting on E. P. Thompson’s The Making of the English Working Class (1963),
Abbott (2007a:81) writes, “[Lyrical sociology] promises the ‘personification’ of people not
before seen as persons.” It gets its power to do this by positioning the particular self in relation
with a particular other, rather than a generalized version of either (see note 17). This relationality
is what makes the lyric ethical. 46 And, through the revelation of the other’s alterity “reason . . . is
found to be in a position to receive” (Levinas 1969:51), which makes it scientific too. 47 The
encounter, real or vicarious, is “the ground of objective knowledge” (Faulconer 2005:52) and
“[k]nowing becomes knowing of a fact only if it is at the same time critical, if it puts itself into
question, goes back beyond its origin’ (Levinas 1969:82). Once knowledge becomes an object of
consciousness, it is reduced to the ability of language to comprehend it.
Faulconer (2005) tells how in the social sciences forming concepts about people is
inevitable. Though they will always be inadequate or impoverished versions of the truth, which
lies ‘beyond being’, they are necessary. However, if they are never called into question by the
otherness of the other, they become unfounded, atemporal, and unrepresentative. In a way,
concepts exist to be ruptured. Levinas (1969:43) says, “We name this calling into question of my
spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics.” A sociology that lacks an approach for both
As Piaget ([1932]1965:196) writes, “Apart from our relations to others there can be no moral necessity.”
This is why Levinas (1969:45-48, 304) argued for ‘Ethics as First Philosophy.’ As well, the notable Scottish
philosopher John MacMurray (1935:21) argued that science is “emotionally conditioned.” He writes how “the main
difficulty that faces us in the development of a scientific knowledge of the world lies not in the outside world but in
our own emotional life. It is the desire to retain beliefs to which we are emotionally attached for some reason or
other. It is the tendency to make the wish father to the thought.” I would argue that both thoughts and feelings spring
forth from the ethical stance of the subject.
46
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doing and presenting this can never be ethical. Though what exists ‘beyond being’ cannot be
captured with language (in the literal sense at least), Faulconer (2005:52) points out that for
Levinas, it is not “beyond our experiential knowledge.” Thus, we need an approach, or a way of
writing, which can both account for and convey the otherness of the other experientially. 48
For the reader, this means that “the understanding of [a] text always requires, in some
sense, a conversion to the text's way of thinking” (Bruns 1992:813). If the reader is to experience
the world of the writer and have an encounter with the other of the study, they must not do to the
writer what the writer has made sure not to do to themselves: “not place himself or herself
outside the situation but in it” (Abbott 2007a:74). Indeed, the reader must place themselves in the
writer’s very shoes if they are to understand anything about the situation, from a lyrical
standpoint, which is in stark contrast with what Wolcott (1994:12-13) suggests for descriptive
qualitative researchers; to have them “remove themselves from the picture, leaving the setting to
communicate directly with the reader.” The lyrical reader only knows of a social situation, in its
fullness, through the writer. They do not—and cannot—come to a knowledge of the world in
spite of the writer, as if the writer distorted their view, but only because of them. The writer is
the mediator of the medium of the text. To remove them would be to remove the part of
experience that is the most human, 49 and thus the most valuable for the type of humanist
sociology Abbott envisions.
In affirming the writer’s own experience, and thus converting to their way of thinking,
the reader denies themselves and their own opinions. Paradoxically though, they find themselves

Just like Faulconer (2005), Abbott believes that narrative “dissolves into lyric (rather than the other way around,
as happens in the eyes of some sociologists)” (Abbott 2007a:83). To create a place for lyrical sociology, one must
relinquish the narrative impulse and realize that this impulse and all its moralizing comes from lyrical experience in
the first place. Why not allow for the immediacy of lyric if lyric is what ultimately allows for narrative?
49
Dunlop (1984:17) writes, “Human beings cannot remain human if they leave a great part of themselves behind.”
48
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more affirmed, and more human—perhaps even more than human. Lewis (1961:138, 141)
writes:
In the moral sphere, every act of justice or charity involves putting ourselves in the other
person's place and thus transcending our own competitive particularity… in reading great
literature I become a thousand men and yet remain myself. … I see with a myriad of
eyes, but it is still I who see. Here, as in worship, in love, in moral action, and in
knowing, I transcend myself; and am never more myself than when I do.
The root of this self-transcendence that the reader experiences is the transcendence of the other
(both the writer and the object of the writer’s investigation), which is at the heart of all ethical
experience (Faulconer 2005:51). 50 As Son (2002:vi) writes, “I propose that we view the lyric
subject not simply as a consciousness of something, but as a release from oneself or, more
fundamentally, as a relationship with alterity.” It is the other’s irreducibility, their ‘beyond
being,’ that “ruptures the horizon of [the reader’s] intentions” (Faulconer 2005:51). Whatever
emotional stance the reader has going in, towards the writer or towards the writer’s object, will
be different than the stance they have going out. Iser (1972:296) writes:
Reading reflects the structure of experience to the extent that we must suspend the ideas
and attitudes that shape our personality before we can experience the unfamiliar world of
the literary text. But during this process, something happens to us.
The something that happens is that the readers purposes are reshaped by the text, the encounter
with the other through it. Reading lyrical sociology is therefore not about interpreting a text, but

Faulconer (2005:51) writes, commenting on Levinas, “Ethical experience is not an experience of the value of the
other. Ethical knowledge is not a knowledge of what counts as good behavior in relation to others. Levinas is not
using the word ethical as we expect. Rather than an experience of the value of another, ethical experience is
transcendent experience, access to a something – someone – exterior to myself… Thus, for Levinas ethics is the
relation to what transcends, to the transcendence of the other person, a relation that makes possible the ordered,
ordinary experience of the everyday.”
50
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about reinterpreting one’s way of seeing the world. 51 As Rosemarie Anderson (2000:44) writes,
“In articulating preliminary lenses, the intuitive researcher [or lyrical reader] places preliminary
lenses in full scrutiny and invites their transformation, revision, removal, amplification, and
refinement as cycles of interpretation proceed.”
As the reader reads and rereads they will gain something new every time, because they
have become someone new every time. If a work ceases to teach, it’s not because it lacks lessons
to be learned, but because the reader has ceased to learn, change, and evolve with it (assuming
again that the text is fashioned in such a way as to allow this). Because they have stopped
receiving, it has stopped giving—not the other way around. Thus, Lewis (1961:11) writes how
“the true reader reads every work seriously in the sense that he reads it whole-heartedly, makes
himself as receptive as he can.” As they do this, they will see the world in “different ways” and
“through different lenses” (Abbott 2007a:76) and begin to develop a more complete picture of
the social world.
One important question to consider is if the receptivity from writer to reader is an honest
one. Does the reader really enter into the writer’s own experience and feel what they feel,
discovering real truths about themselves and the world on their way? Or, do they merely feel
what they want to feel and resonate with the things that they already find true? As Davis
(2006:278) asks it:
Does something happen when we read, or has everything significant already happened
before we even pick up the text? Does the text have the capacity to transform us, or do
Bruns (1992:813) writes that in reading true works of literature, “[W]e always end up having to reinterpret
ourselves, and even change ourselves, in the light of the text. To understand a text is not only to grasp its meaning; it
is to understand the claim that it has on us. Most often this claim is critical in the strong sense, as when a text
exposes us to our prejudices, by which Gadamer means not only our private, subjective dispositions but, more
important, the conceptual frameworks we inhabit and to which we appeal when we try to make sense of things.
More is at stake in interpretation than interpretation. What would it be for a text to explode the conceptual world of
the one who seeks to interpret it?”
51
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we simply appropriate it as our reflecting mirror? Are we constituted through our
encounters with the other, or can the other only be encountered insofar as it already
conforms to what we want of it?
It is possible that people experience works as lyrical only because the works evoke the feelings
that already conform to their existing beliefs. Or, as McDonnell, Bail, and Tavory (2017)
recently suggested, some people resonate not with what they find true but what they find useful.
Altieri (1998:292) likewise notices this tendency: “In our experiences of the lyrical at least,
willing often takes place less through an interpretation of what is true or good about the text than
an attachment to what is powerful within it.”
The whole purpose of the stance and mechanics of this chapter, and the previous one, is
to help the reader to recognize if they are resonating on grounds other than the lyrical or ethical
(i.e. the moral, the theoretical, the political). In fact, Attridge (2017:176) would argue that the
truly ethical has no grounds, at least not in the conventional sense:
Not only is there no moral or pragmatic ground for responsibility, there is also no
philosophical ground. The ethical force that conditions the creative act is ungrounded—
here Levinas’s difficult thinking is valuable—because it is prior to any possible grounds.
Without responsibility for the other, as we have seen, there would be no other; with no
other, repeatedly appearing, always different, there would be no same, no self, no society,
no morality.
The relationship with the other precedes ethics, which fits with what Abbott says in a different
piece, about how “a new normative ontology must, first, embody a genuine theory of
particularity” (Abbott 2015:13). In the experience with the other, the writer, reader, whoever,
sees their own thinking self and purposes thrown to the side in a radical call to responsibility and
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knowing that can only be described as mystery, rather than resonance. As Levinas (1987:75)
writes of the effect of the ethical encounter:
But this precisely indicates that the other is in no way another myself, participating with
me in a common existence. The relationship with the other is not an idyllic and
harmonious relationship of communion, or a sympathy through which we put ourselves
in the other's place; we recognize the other as resembling us, but exterior to us; the
relationship with the other is a relationship with a Mystery.
Abbott does a good job at describing how this encounter occurs. He hits the nail on the head
when he says that “particularity… is something we share” (2007a:96). This simple observation
could some up the main thrust in Levinas’s thought and is the proper ethical stance of the reader.
It is a knowledge that readers continue to evolve into the more they read and reread various
lyrical works.
Though Abbott doesn’t explicitly make the relational-ethical connection to the extent that
Levinas does, to me, this ethical relationality seems to lie at the heart of his motivations for
rethinking ontology and epistemology. 52 Reflecting back on his previous work critiquing
variable-based approaches, he writes:
Now to be sure, subsequent reflection has persuaded me that one could make the case that
there was a values critique implicit in this strand of my work; recoding human individuals
as the mere intersections of reified variables did turn out to be an important—perhaps the
most important—way that social scientists contributed to the formation of mass society.

Nowhere is this more evident than in his recent book, Varieties of Social Imagination, where, under the alias of
Barbara Celarent (2017), he includes a series of reviews (published in AJS from July 2009 to November 2015) on
the works of others from distant times and places. Abbott states that this was Professor Celarent’s guiding morality:
“One should take the past and the other seriously: on their own terms, not as not-yet-realized or garbled versions of
one's own supposed perfection or even one's own supposed ideals. After all, we will ourselves be past soon enough,
and we are someone else’s other already” (xiv). A true sociologist honors the otherness of the other.
52
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Therefore, to take a stand against variables-based methods was in its own way a rebellion
against the massification and dehumanization of people. But that certainly wasn’t my
original intent (2007b:197).
Using Levinas to read Abbott helps to differentiate lyrical sociology from the aesthetic and from
the types of moralism Abbott both resists and even advocates. Of the latter, the “values critique”
implicit in Abbott’s work and his proposal for a more humanist sociology (Abbott 2007a:96;
Abbott 2007b), Levinas would argue, doesn’t go far enough. “Humanism,” Levinas writes, “has
to be denounced because it is not sufficiently human” (Levinas [1981] 1998:128). I would argue
that this latter type of ethical concern is present in Abbott’s work, even if not explicitly stated,
and that for a lyrical sociology to be ethical, both the writer and reader must attune themselves to
the ethical nature the entire research process, from pre-production to post-consumption. This
involves both understanding and implementing the proper lyrical stance and mechanics
throughout. I now turn to a discussion on the specific mechanics required of the reader of lyrical
texts.
Mechanics: Reader
A large part of the work to transmit feeling from writer to reader is determined by the
writer. Abbott writes how the emotional imagination of the writer must “juxtapose strong images
and powerful feelings to awaken in a reader the emotion that the poet has himself felt”
(2007a:72). There are rules the writer must follow since, as Dobie (2011:137) says, the text
provides “the materials and determines the boundaries for the creative act of reading.” 53
However, the text itself does not and cannot replace the focus of mind required of the reader to
produce a lyrical response. Stanley Fish (1980:326) writes of this aesthetic response in poetry, “It
As Iser (1972:287) likewise comments, “The ‘stars’ in a literary text are fixed; the lines that join them are
variable.”
53
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is not that the presence of poetic qualities compels a certain kind of attention but that the paying
of a certain kind of attention results in the emergence of poetic qualities.” Thus, the lyricality of
a text, as given by the writer, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for its lyricism to be
received by the reader. The reader must do their part.
In this section, I want to focus on the particular ways in which to read lyrical texts and
show how these ways differ from other types of reading in terms of their effort, attention, skill,
and feeling. Abbott (2007a:94) stresses the importance of “audience participation.” He writes, “If
one reads only to find the narrative or structural account of a temporal and social present, the
lyrical text will read as a disappointment.” For those who read and are receptive to the lyrical
experience of a text, they will find that an account with both affective and ethical dimensions
that provide not only a different kind of knowledge about the social world but, more notably,
suggest a different way of knowing.
Lewis (1961:19), in a book on literary criticism, writes that, “The first demand any work
of art makes upon us is surrender. Look. Listen. Receive. Get yourself out of the way”; and that,
“There is no good asking first whether the work before you deserves such a surrender, for until
you have surrendered you cannot possibly find out.” He calls his book An Experiment in
Criticism, because he experiments with the question of whether ‘bad’ books are ‘bad’ because
they are poorly written or because they are poorly read. He writes, “Normally we judge men’s
literary taste by the things they read. [My] question [is] whether there might be some advantage
in reversing the process and judging literature by the way men read it” (104).
Donald Hall (1983) writes about four kinds of reading. The first he calls reading for
information. Applying his ideas to academics, this kind of reading involves quickly scanning
journal articles, books, and/or periodicals, looking for key findings or figures, and ignoring
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material that is irrelevant. The second kind is reading for ideas. This type of reading occurs
slowly with much time “spent with the eyes turned away from the pages, reflecting on the text
(165). In the social sciences, while the first is characteristic of how one might read an empirical
article, especially quantitative, the second is how one would read a theoretical piece.
The third way of reading Hall identifies is what he calls reading to escape, or “narcotic
reading” (165). This is reading done in exchange for the pleasure a text gives, whether of
excitement or relaxation. He says that this reader is, ironically, “interested not in experience and
feeling but in turning off the possibilities of experience and feeling” (165), arguing that “once the
characters reach into the reader's feelings, he [the reader] is able to stop reading, or glance away,
or superimpose his own daydreams” (165-166). The last kind of reading he calls reading to
engage. This type of reading is slow, and deliberate, and focuses on every word. Like Fish
(1980), alluded to above, it requires all the attention of their mind. Hall (1983) writes:
[T]he great writers reward this attention. Only by the full exercise of our powers to
receive language can we absorb their intelligence and their imagination. This kind of
reading goes through the ear--though the eye takes in the print, and decodes it into
sound—to the throat and the understanding, and it can never be quick. It is slow and
sensual, a deep pleasure that begins with touch and ends with the sort of comprehension
that we associate with dream. . . . To read literature is to be intimately involved with the
words on the page, and never to think of them as the embodiments of ideas which can be
expressed in other terms. . . . Great literature, if we read it well, opens us up to the world,
and makes us more sensitive to it, as if we acquired eyes that could see through things
and ears that could hear smaller sounds (164-5).
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This describes lyrical reading, and writing, in a nut shell. While, as Culler (1997:77) says,
“Narrative poems recount an event; lyrics, we might say, strive to be an event.” 54 Lyrical readers
don’t just read for information, ideas, or pleasure, but read to become one with “the person
whose emotional experience of a social world is at the heart of his or her writing” (Abbott
2007a:74). If done properly (assuming that which one reads permits it), reading a lyrically
inspired text can help to reconcile the reader with the writer through its words, or rather through
the experience of the text as a whole (Flyvbjerg 2006:241), and the unique effect it has on
them. 55 Rather than merely re-presenting reality, words bring it forth anew—every time a little
different (depending on how one reads it)—and allow the reader to re-live it, as if for the first
time, each time (which seems to be in line with how Bell envisions the lyric too; see note 14). 56
Laurel Richardson (2000:11) tells how in evocative forms of writing, the writer is
constantly “holding back on interpretation [and] asking the reader to emotionally ‘relive’ the
events with the writer.” The same goes for reading. The reader must also hold back on
interpreting, in the way interpretation is traditionally conceived, if they are to experience the text
in the way that it is intended. In the study of poetry, for example, Van Manen (1944:39) writes,
“it is inappropriate to ask for a conclusion or a summary [i.e. to interpret] … To summarize a

Or, as he says in another place, “If narrative is about what happens next, lyric is about what happens now— in the
reader’s engagement with each line” (Culler 2008:202).
55
With Levinas’ understanding of empathy, a complete reconciliation of writer and reader (as well the writer and the
people he or she writes about) is impossible (Levinas 1987:75-76, 90). Fusion is both an illusion and a reduction of
the other’s radical otherness. However, this doesn’t mean that one should avoid taking steps in that direction. In fact,
moving towards the other, or at least facing them, is at the heart of his idea of the ethical encounter.
56
Attridge (2017:150) stresses how, in literature, every word matters:
In some kinds of text, the author’s creative labor is centered on the manipulation of ideas, the construction
of arguments, the representation of existing entities in a new light, or the imagination of hitherto nonexistent entities. In other kinds of text, the ones we call literary, such labor is combined with, and is in a
certain sense always subject to, the selection and arrangement of words. In these works, otherness and
singularity arise from the encounter with the words themselves, their sequence, their suggestiveness, their
patterning, their interrelations, their sounds and rhythms. To re-experience the otherness of a work of this
type, it is not enough to recall the arguments made, the ideas introduced, the images conjured up; it is
necessary to re-read or recall the words, in their created order.
54
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poem in order to present the result would destroy the result because the poem itself is the result.
The poem is the thing.” There is no lyrical truth value in merely recounting what happened or in
reading such a recounting. To do so would destroy the event of lyric. Information can be
imparted but experience must, at the risk of being tautological, be experienced!
In lyrical sociology, the presentation of the empirical data in the form of a text—
constituted in many cases by the first hand ethnographic experience of the writer-asmethodological-instrument (Lucas 2016:21 footnote 23)—is not distinct from the interpretation
of his or her experience, because the experience itself is already an interpretation in the moment
of creative decision when it is put into words on a page. Abbott (2007a:84) quotes Paul de Man
(1983:152) who says, “The ambivalence of writing is such that it can be considered both an act
and an interpretative process that follows an act with which it cannot coincide.” The stance and
mechanics of writing lyrical sociology ensure that this interpretation is conveyed in a way that
fits the data, or the emotional experience of the writer, as closely as humanly possible. Inasmuch
as it does, or attempts to, the writing is said to meet what T.S. Eliot has famously described as an
“objective correlative” wherein the author tries to describe, “a set of objects, a situation, a chain
of events which [are] the formula of [a] particular emotion; such that when the external facts,
which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked”
(Eliot 1951:145; referenced in Abbott 2007a:94 footnote 40).
Eliot’s idea of an objective correlative has been critiqued as offering a somewhat
representational and deterministic view of language, which is understandable if the text is, as
Rosenblatt (1978:23) believes, “merely an object of paper and ink until some reader responds to
the marks on the page as verbal symbols.” However, in lyrical sociology words have a nonverbal quality as well. They are also musical. Each word adds rhythm and tone to a text. Words
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make noise, whether spoken allowed or internalized in a reader’s own head. 57 The way they are
arranged suggest crescendos and decrescendos, pauses and sudden starts, accelerandos and
ritardandos that transcend their merely symbolic meanings, and which carry a force of their own.
The reader who tunes in to these non-verbal features is one who has learned to “read between the
lines.” 58 In doing this, through some process as ineffable as experience itself, the reader, who is
worthy of it, responds to the writer themselves, not just marks on a page.
This takes an enormous amount of effort and skill (or natural ability). Lewis (1961:98)
writes:
When the art of reading poetry requires talents hardly less exalted than the art of writing
it, readers cannot be much more numerous than poets. If you write a piece for the fiddle
that only one performer in a hundred can play you must not expect to hear it very often
performed.
Reading can thus be considered a performance, where practice makes perfect. 59 As with playing
the fiddle, the piano, or some other solo instrument, there are those who sight-read a piece once
and think they know it. 60 Then there are those who play a piece again and again, only to discover
Hall (1983:164) writes, “If we read a work of literature properly, we read slowly, and we hear all the words. If our
lips do not actually move, it's only laziness. The muscles in our throats move, and come together when we see the
word ‘squeeze.’ We hear the sounds so accurately that if a syllable is missing in a line of poetry we hear the lack,
though we may not know what we are lacking. In prose we accept the rhythms, and hear the adjacent sounds. We
also register a track of feeling through the metaphors and associations of words.”
58
McDonald (2008:29) draws upon and quotes Levinas to tell just how this “between the lines” phenomenon relates
to poetry’s unique ability to be between time too, and thus disruptive of narrative plot: “It is in the interiority of the
moment that the alterity of time is encountered. the source of poetry’s musical impower, its interruption of the
synchronic continuities of philosophical language, is the interstices of time, the entretemps: ‘it is of the essence of
art to signify only between the lines—in the intervals of time, between times [entretemps]—like a foot-print that
would precede the step, or an echo preceding the sound of a voice’ [Levinas [1975] 1996:7].”
59
Attridge (2017:133-134) says, “[T]he literary work exists only in performance,” but recognizes that “[m]ost of the
sentences we read or hear we do not perform, in this sense; we recognize, apprehend, interpret them, perhaps feel or
do something as an immediate consequence, but we treat their words cognitively and instrumentally.” Oatley (1999)
sees reading as a performance in the sense that it is a simulation that is run on the minds of readers.
60
Lewis (1961:13) writes how, “There are those who read only when there is nothing better to do, gobble up each
story to ‘find out what happened’, and seldom go back to it; others who reread and are profoundly moved.” To go
through a piece of music once, you might come away knowing what is there, what it consists of, and what to expect
if you were to play it again. But, to go through multiple iterations of a piece, you will know why what is there is
57
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that there is more depth than they had previously realized. 61 A work of art, like a person, can
never be fully grasped. Thus, the medium of the lyric is its greatest message for sociology
(McLuhan 1994), namely its irreducibility of persons through its irreducibility as a form. 62
The recognition of the alterity of the other person, which is at the heart of the ethical
encounter, is made manifest through “the alterity, or otherness, of the artwork” (McDonald
2008:16), wherein the textual encounter becomes a personal encounter (Buell 1999:13) and the
experience of the sublime (Abbott 2007a:96) is transformed into “an experience of other people”
(Alford 2002:37). Thus, there is a relationship between the writer and the text they write and the
reader and the text they read, as well as the world the text is about and the worlds the writer and
reader both inhabit. The lyrical stance involves all of the personal and ethical considerations for
having a lyrical experience while the lyrical mechanics involves the approach to the text one
takes, or the textual considerations for the communication of that experience. As Eaglestone
(1997:94) writes, “ethics and language are intertwined in an inescapable way,” so too are the
stance and mechanics of lyrical sociology.

there. You will start to understand not just the music, but the musician too, and all their idiosyncrasies. This is when
you become a master yourself and composer in your own right, as if you could have written the piece yourself.
61
This new depth is not unrealized in the sense that it wasn’t known, but in the sense that it wasn’t known in the
way it is now known. Becker (1982:x), for example, writes, “I think it is generally true that sociology does not
discover what no one ever knew before, in this differing from the natural sciences. Rather, good social science
produces a deeper understanding of things that many people are already pretty much aware of.”
62
Giving a place for lyrical sociology in the social sciences, and sociology in particular, not only allows for one
irreducible approach to social inquiry (the lyrical), but would make the overall approach to research more open and
less reducible. As Smelser ([1994] 2014:76) writes of a discipline between science, humanism, and art, “the benefit
is living in a field that refuses to seal itself into a closed paradigm and threatens to exhaust itself, but, rather, retains
the qualities of intellectual openness and imagination.”
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CHAPTER 4: VIGNETTES
Given the understanding of the lyric I have suggested so far, I turn now to the empirical
portion of the piece in an attempt to do a lyrical sociology from the ground up. Drawing upon my
experience living as a missionary in inner-city Detroit, what follows is a series of vignettes
detailing the city, the people I met, and my own emotional experience as a temporally and
subjectively located human being trying to make sense of both. For the reader, the opportunity
here is to apply the stance and mechanics detailed in the previous sections in order see and feel
what life was like in Detroit. In the next chapter, I describe my process in writing them and my
own experience in reading them. This chapter, though, is meant to give the student of lyrical
sociology a first-hand experience with a lyrical piece, by one who has wrought it not by accident,
but intentionally.
Robby Austin
My mission companion and I visited a man almost every week named Robby Austin. 63
Robby was white—the only one on his street—and in his thirties, with tattoos all up and down
his arms and, though he had a girlfriend in the suburbs, he lived alone. When we would visit, he
would always, without invitation, enter into war stories about living in Detroit, making it hard to
get into the lesson, but worth it. To me, his war stories were just life stories, because in Detroit,
life was war.
“If I was in Detroit, I would have killed him!” Robby tells us. His sister’s boyfriend, who
lived outside of the city in the suburb of Lincoln Park, had abused her, and Robby Austin was
furious. Though I probably would have just encouraged her to file a police report, Tommy took
matters into his own hands when it came to family. He told us how, with his sister on the phone

63

Pseudonyms are used.

58

giving him directions, he drove over to the boyfriend’s house, knocked on the door, and asked
the person who answered to go and get the boyfriend so he could “talk to him for a minute.”
Immediately as the boyfriend stepped out, Robby grabbed him by the lapel, threw him off
the porch, and started beating him with his fists. As he told us this, he rose up from his sunken
couch and punched the air in front of him. Robby continued telling us how he dragged his
opponent to the street and, leaving him for a moment, went to his car to get his gun. With his
sister still on the phone, which was now in his pocket, she yelled “Get him Robby!” Without
hesitating, Robby grabbed the gun and told us he heard a voice in his head guiding him what to
do next.
Going back to the boyfriend, he kneeled over him, flipped his gun around and, holding it
by the barrel, started to hit him in the mouth with the other end, knocking in a couple of his teeth.
Robby threatened him, still reenacting to us pointing his finger in the rhythm of his words: “If
you ever touch my sister again, I will kill you!” I glanced quickly over at my companion,
noticing his mouth and eyes were just as wide open as mine, and asked curiously, “How long ago
was this?” He told us, “Oh, just the other day.” I cringed.
Robby stood up, walked to the window, and peeked out the blinds. We sat on the couch
in the dim light of his front room trying to teach him a missionary lesson but kept getting
distracted by his stories. They seemed so wild and crazy to me, and I loved hearing them. He
explained that his sister’s boyfriend was in a motorcycle gang and that they threatened to come
and shoot up his house. I realized we were in the front of the house and easy targets for a frontal
assault. Though I liked hearing his stories, I didn’t really want to become a part of one.
The night before, his buddy and he waited for the boyfriend and gang all night, laying on
their bellies on the grass across the street with their assault rifles. They dressed up in all black,
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hoping that when the gang came, they would surprise them by an attack from behind. Though
sadly, as he put it, they didn’t come. I envisioned the carnage of bikes and bodies had they.
Robby had about eighty plants of marijuana growing in his basement and slept in his
kitchen at night with his machine gun, just in case anyone (competitors) tried to come in and
destroy his crop. He told us that if we ever told anyone about his little plantation, he would kill
us. Tattle-telling, whistle-blowing, or “narking,” as Detroiters called it, was about the worse
thing one could do, according to the code on the street—worse than murder. We promised we
wouldn’t say anything.
I was absorbed by the craziness of his stories, of his life, of who he was, of what he did to
survive. It was the same with house fires, with hearing gunshots, with collecting bullet shells on
the side of the road, with hearing the sound of rap music blasted through tinted windows, with
seeing urban blight all around: trashed, burnt down, boarded up, and closed Detroit. It horrified
me and it fascinated me at the same time. The city was so different to me than back home, as if
from a post-apocalyptic movie. But I was in it. And, I couldn’t wait to go home and tell everyone
about it; about how I, like Robby, survived—about how brave I was.
Childhood
When I was in first grade, in Arizona, I fantasized as I lay in bed at night of saving my
classmates from an estranged gunman. I would bravely take a bullet for the curly haired red-head
girl I had a crush on and survive, just barely, becoming a hero to her and everyone else in the
school. The grade-year before as a kindergartener, my favorite movie was Kindergarten Cop,
with Arnold Schwarzenegger. I watched it at my Grandma’s house at least once a day after
school, sometimes twice. Arnold Schwarzenegger, as John Kimball, was an undercover cop who
posed as a teacher to save the school from just such a scenario. He succeeded but got shot,
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though won the heart and honor of a woman his age. I wanted to be like him; strong, courageous,
and recognized.
We moved to Texas where there was a boy who lived on my street named Mitch. He had
a gun and hated my friends. One of my friend’s older brothers punched him on the corner of the
street in front of my house a few days earlier and nearly broke his own hand he hit him so hard.
Mitch told us to watch our backs. I skipped school for a week, telling my parents “My stomach
hurts,” though it actually kind of did. I had heartburn and acid reflux. When I went back, I saw
Mitch in the hall. He looked at me funny. I went to the nurse and asked to leave early, throwing
up in my mouth as I waited for my mom.
We visited my family in Arizona over Christmas Break and went out to the desert to
celebrate the New Years. My cousins, brother, and uncle left to go out hunting before it got dark,
but I stayed behind and hid, crying on the back seat of my cousin’s F-150. I hated guns. I laid flat
below the line of the windows to avoid any stray bullets that might come my way. I heard shots
close by. They came over and gestured to me to join them. I didn’t. I couldn’t. “Guns are loud
and hurt my ears,” I told them. “I’ll just sit in the truck.” They called me a baby.
In high school, at a gas station, I was drinking a Slurpee in the back of my truck late at
night with a couple of friends from school. A lowered beat up sports car pulled up next to us with
a deep bass pounding to a song one of my friends recognized, to which he started singing along.
Two white guys, one skinny one chubby, got out and the chubby one thought we were making
fun of him. He was wearing a sleeveless tank top and his arms jiggled as he came up to the bed
of the truck waving them, “What? You got a problem?”
He wanted a fight, and even slapped one of my friends, who was a football player, in the
back of the head, but my friend and all of us kept our cool and they eventually left. When I got
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home, I sat in my room paralyzed on my computer chair for what seemed like an hour, in silence,
with my eyes fixed on the floor, trying to slow down my heartbeat and breathe.
After this experience, I did not want to go out anymore. I kindly refused all invitations
from my friends, whenever they called or texted, giving excuses. Since I kept turning them down
over the phone, they came over to my house to try and persuade me in person. They invited me
to go to a movie I really wanted to see. I told them I had laundry to do. “On a Friday night?” they
contested. I felt terrible as I rejected them, especially to their faces, sad that I couldn’t go to see
the movie, frustrated with my own fear, but safe that I was still home.
Mission Assignment
I was so excited when I got my mission assignment in the mail, until I saw where to.
“You are hereby called to labor in the Michigan, Detroit mission … for a period of twenty-four
months.” “What!” I screamed inside. “Cool.” I said out loud to the group of family and friends
who came to see me open it. I had told one of these friends a couple weeks before sending in my
application that I wanted to go somewhere out of the country, warm, and not a big city. I gave
him three examples, of places that I for sure did not want to go: “New York, Chicago, or
Detroit.” I knew these cities were “ghetto” and unsafe for people like me (white, middle-class).
And, since I was already afraid to go out in my own suburban hometown of Gilbert, Arizona,
which was ranked one of the safest cities in the U.S., how could I go to one of the most
dangerous?
One of my cousins immediately hopped on the computer and started spitting off facts
about the high number of violent crimes, homicides, thefts, and everything else about Detroit I
didn’t want to hear, but already suspected. My worst nightmare was coming true. I literally
thought I was going to die, and the statistics didn’t convince me otherwise. Some of my friends
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and family could sense my hesitancy and nervousness. I told them it was because of the cold,
that I didn’t want to freeze to death. Being from Arizona and about only 2% body fat, it was a
good excuse, but it wasn’t the real reason.
Prayer
I prayed desperately that I would be safe on my mission and have the courage to go—and
stay—that I wouldn’t have a panic attack. I did a year of community college before my mission
and took an introductory psychology class in which we learned about various mental illnesses.
There was one that sounded uncomfortably familiar: agoraphobia—fear of situations that might
cause panic, helplessness, or embarrassment—and I self-diagnosed.
Most of my family members prayed for me as well, so I was told. I say most, because my
Dad is an Atheist, and would never do such a thing. My Dad had two sons, one who was serving
in the army in Afghanistan, my brother, and me who was serving a mission in Detroit. Of the two
of us, he was more worried about me. Though I believed in a Divine power to protect me, he said
at least my brother had a gun.
Dogs
Dogs were, if not the greatest threat, at least the most common one. They would scavenge
the city for food and, with primal instincts, chase us as we rode by like prey. As a missionary, I
learned a few ways to deal with aggressive dogs that also turned out to work well against
aggressive people. For instance, if a group of teenagers, who looked hungry for action, ever
came towards us on the same side of the street, we would never cross the street to avoid them—
because then they would know we were afraid. Instead, we would walk towards them smiling
with excitement and say, “We’re missionaries!” Then they would run from us.
With dogs, if I barked at them first or more intensely, I could dissuade them from
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pursuing me. Once, my companion and I were riding at about half-speed when a medium sized,
long haired, black mutt came bolting out of a backyard gate that was usually closed and started
chasing us. Impulsively I started to pedal quicker, but saw that the dog was slower, so I slowed
down allowing it to catch up to me, just to see what it would do.
It barked and barked as it ran along side of me and then threw its head at my heel trying
to bite it, which panicked me. My first reaction was to yell at it. However, my yell was a yelp,
and sounded more like a bark, so I went with it and continued to bark at it. When I did, the dog
slowed down and then stopped, standing in the middle of the street with its head cocked to the
side and with puzzled eyes.
There were also more proactive ways to deal with the dog problem. We told one young
man we were teaching about how there were dogs that chased us by his house. The next day he
surprised us by saying, “You know them dogs?” We said, “Yeah.” “We’ll you ain’t gotta worry
‘bout them no more.” “What do you mean?” “My boy took care of them.” Holding his hand out
like a gun, “Pop. Pop.”
Sandra
Detroiters often seemed accustomed to many of the threats and chaos I observed. One
day we talked outside on the porch to Sandra, a hard to find Hispanic lady from the Church. Her
two youngest, a boy and a girl, were contently playing in the front yard. A couple houses down, a
middle-aged man dressed in all black, blinged-out with a silver chain necklace and dazzling
wristwatch, was on his phone having a heated discussion with someone on the other end. He
paced back and forth in front of his house while he waved his hands in the air, yelled, and cursed.
This worried me a little, but I reassured myself that he wasn’t mad at me.
Sandra talked calmly. After evading us all winter, we finally caught her outside. It was a
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beautiful spring day, not too hot yet; a perfect time to be out. Down the road, two teenage boys
with sagging pants came walking slowly down the middle of the street in our direction. One held
his belt and next to his hand I saw the grip of a gun sticking out. Is that what I thought it was? I
tensed up and kept an eye on it, and him, but also tried to not let him see me looking, hoping they
would leave us alone.
The children filled the air with the music of motor sounds as they ran and pushed small
trucks through the grass. Sandra idled and revved on about her husband. Across the street were
two unoccupied houses: one was hollowed inside, burnt, and abandoned; the other was mostly
ash and trash, with weeds attempting to overtake it, only the foundation and a few charcoaled
supports remaining. On Sandra’s side of the street, between her and her noisy neighbor, was a
well-kept garden she planted in memory of her oldest girl who was kidnapped and killed years
ago. They found her burnt bones and clothing debris inside a wooden chest in the brush of an
empty lot.
The boys continued walking, owning the street. They passed by the noisy neighbor, the
memorial, and finally got to us, but didn’t stop, confront, or even seem to notice us, and
eventually swaggered out of sight. I sighed in relief. The angry man got off his phone and went
inside. We closed our conversation with Sandra and said bye to the kids, who played on, like
their mother, no matter what.
House Fire
We saw smoke rising above the cityscape a few blocks away. Fires were common, seeing
them almost every other week; once, three times in one day. This one was black and billowing,
which must have meant it was still fresh. We had some extra time before lunch, so we decided to
investigate. We sped over and rolled up on our bikes just as the fire engines did.
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The house, which was a two-story, looked like it had been abandoned for a while. Bright
orange flames shot out the windows and door. It was beautiful. We could feel the heat across the
street. Others who heard the sirens came out to watch as well, one man even brought a lawn
chair; a neighborhood block party. We saw an older Hispanic man we taught earlier that day,
also on his bike watching. I tried to tell him in broken Spanish a joke about how religion was like
fire insurance for those who didn’t want to burn in hell. Maybe my Spanish was bad, but he
didn’t laugh.
The firemen hurried to pull the heavy hoses close enough to shoot inside the house. One
wall looked like it was about to collapse. The flames were big, and the struggle was real, so I
asked my companion to take a picture of me in front of the house. Not knowing how to pose, I
smiled and gave a thumbs-up. Behind the burning house, a man with white headphones and no
shirt mowed his lawn and whistled.
Felip
Felip was a Hispanic man married with three daughters who was not a member of our
church. We caught him on the sidewalk in front of his house just as he got home from work and
straddled our bikes as we talked. Others were out as well. His neighbor, who told us he was
Baptist, sat on the front steps and watched his granddaughter ride her pink scooter. A group of
about five or six young men stood in the grass near the porch of the house across the street. It
was cooler to be outside this time of the year, especially in the early evening.
Tires screeched behind Felip. A light blue Grand Marquis came to a halt at the
intersection on the corner, stopping just past the point where it could turn. It sat there for a
moment. I looked around. All eyes were fixed on the car. Except Felip’s, which only glanced
back quickly when he heard the noise. The car reversed and then turned to come down the street
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toward us. It crept slowly and then stopped. The windows were tinted all black. A loud boom
came from inside the car—a subwoofer—and then it proceeded, pulsing down the street,
pounding its chest.
Across the street, the teens turned from facing each other to facing the car, following it as
it moved. They stood more erect, pushing out their chests too, and cocked their heads to look
down at the car. A few hands went down under their shirts into their pants. I swung my leg from
over my bike and stood next to it instead, preparing to jump belly-first behind a nearby car at the
first sight or sound of a gun.
Felip continued talking. My companion, who was closer to him, tried to resolve some of
his concerns with religion in general, explaining to him about how our church was different. I
felt queasy. My chest was tight and my heart thumped with the bass.
The car passed at a snail's pace and then sped off, screeching its tires again. The guys
across the street freed their hands and turned again to casual conversation. I heard them mention
something about someone getting shot recently. Felip was still talking to my companion. I hadn’t
heard a word he said. He needed to go in and get supper though. We scheduled a time to come
back. My companion wanted to keep going down the street and talk to more people. I suggested
we leave.
Flin
My companion and I, and the other set of Spanish speaking missionaries who worked in
the area, helped an older guy named Flin, who wasn’t a member of our church. Once a week, we
helped pack his house up for an impending move to the suburbs. He lived in Corktown, a historic
Irish district just west of the city center, in an old two-story house that was literally, in some
places, filled to the ceiling with boxes and books. He had been having trouble recently with
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people breaking in and decided it was time to move. He loved Detroit, had been raised there his
whole life, and was Irish to the core. At one point, he was the city’s historiographer, which I
thought suited him well when I reflected on how much old stuff he had.
As a courtesy, he would come pick us up in his car from our apartments on the days we
went by to help him. It was our weekly Tuesday ritual all through the winter and into the spring.
On an early spring morning, when the snow had finally given in, Frank came and picked us and
the other missionaries up. As we made our way to his house, he started driving a different
direction, though we didn’t even realize at first. Flin was funny and sometimes insisted on going
down certain streets just because he liked the way they sounded (e.g. the street John Kronk), and
the other missionary companionship and we were busy exchanging Detroit horror stories from
the previous week: a drug bust, a drive-by shooting, a house fire. Though these events were
becoming less surprising to us, they were still fun to tell about. Flin just told us to pray for these
people.
He stopped the car on a random street and got out. One of the missionaries rolled down
the window and yelled, rolling his eyes, “Flin, what are you doing?” He had his phone out and
said “Come on. We need a photo.” I looked around and saw that the house we were pulled in
front of had two beautiful blooming magnolia trees. They were so beautiful and pink, in fact, that
they seemed out of place. Flin flew out of the car as we all dragged our feet to the foot of the
tree, trying not to step on the apron of petals that had fallen at the edge. Giving cheesy smiles,
Flin told us to be serious and snapped a picture with his phone.
We got back in the car and made our way again toward his house. On a main street again,
as if trying to dodge an animal, he swerved right onto another small street. We each screamed
“Flin!” What was he doing now? He pointed his finger out the window and exclaimed, “Oh my,
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look at those flowers!” With a collective sigh we followed him out of the car again as he, and
some of the other missionaries now, snapped close-ups of every variety of wildflower that had
grown up in the empty lot.
Next to us was a dilapidated house that had been the victim of a fire not too long ago. I
looked around and pulled out my camera, setting its timer, and put it gently on the ground in the
midst of the field of flowers, tactically angled in the direction of the house. Scooting back about
ten steps, I kneeled and smiled, making sure not to obscure the background. I was wearing my
new University of Michigan jacket. “This will be such a cool shot to send home,” I thought.
Auto Show
We rode the bus downtown to the Auto show held at Detroit’s Cobo Center, which
happened once a year and attracted visitors from all over the U.S. The event ran for a little over a
week, allowing us to go on our day off. On route, we talked with Bottle Man—as we called
him—a guy we knew very little about except that he was always on the bus and was always
collecting bottles. He was usually the only one who talked on the bus, whether to someone else
or to himself, though we were one of the few who talked back. When we did, he would get really
excited and louder, telling us jumbled stories about current events, TV shows, and history. At
certain parts in our exchange, he would tell us how to respond, imploring, “Say that’s amazing.”
If we didn’t say what he asked, he would repeat himself until we did.
“That’s amazing.”
Other people on the bus laughed as we humored him. I even snuck a video with my
camera to show my family when I got home. They would probably think he was as funny as I
did.
When we arrived, I could tell that hardly anyone visiting the car show was local, partly
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because of their attire, but mostly because of their skin color. Most people at the show were
white and where we worked, in Southwest Detroit, most people were either Black or Hispanic.
We walked toward the entry of the auto show. I could see through the doors crowds of people
and could hear loud upbeat music playing over the PA system. Inside, there were fast cars, big
trucks, and slick SUV’s, beautiful women in skimpy outfits posing next to them, flashing lights
from commercials on screens and from above and around all the different exhibits.
I immediately felt out of place and wanted to turn back, but I assured myself that it was
our day off and we were supposed to have fun and ease up a little. I also felt strangely put off,
almost offended, and a little territorial; like people were there without my permission. I felt like I
should have had an all-access pass, that I should have been a VIP, along with my other
missionary companions, and that we should have been able to bring as many guests as we
wanted; Robby, Sandra, Felip, Flin, Bottle Man. We were the ones who really knew Detroit. We
were Detroit. Not these rich white people from the suburbs, I thought. They only knew about this
one little area downtown, the part the city kept clean to attract visitors’ tax revenue.
At the minivans, I saw an anomaly, a little black girl sitting in the back of one that had a
chess-set built into it. She was sitting so cute and smiling, so I ran up and waited for the white
people who were close by to get out of the frame and then took a picture of her, making it seem
like I was just taking a picture of the van. In a sea of suburbanites, she was what I wanted to see.
She was the Detroit I knew and loved. She was me.
Car
On a Sunday night, my mission companion and I were coming home late from a church
meeting, riding in the car of an older Hispanic couple we had invited, Miguel and Andria. We
had been visiting them for a while. And although they were not yet members, they would happily
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come with us to church events, give us rides, and feed us whenever we came over. We loved
them! They also happened to be undocumented immigrants from Mexico and were very aware of
their sensitive status. We were all tired and sat quietly as we made our way back for the night.
Waiting at a stoplight close to both our houses, on Livernois and Michigan Avenue, the
light turned green and, on the corner diagonally from us, a man commenced to cross the street.
Out of nowhere, a car coming from the other direction made a quick right and hit him, knocking
him under the wheels and driving over him like a speed bump.
Our immigrant friend paused accelerating for a second as we watched the man attempt to
get up and walk it off but fall back down, grimacing in pain. In shock at what had just happened,
I wondered, like Miguel seemed to, if we should stop to help, but his wife hurriedly told us, “We
can’t stop. We can’t risk being around the cops.” I didn’t say anything. So, we drove off just like
the guy who hit him.
L-Dog
I don’t remember what L-dog’s real name was. He lived in a 20-story housing project
downtown next to someone who ordered a free Bible from a commercial the church was running
locally. We were supposed to visit the guy who ordered the Bible, but when we knocked on his
door, his neighbor, L-dog, thought we were knocking for him. He told us his real name but said
we could just call him L-dog and asked if we could come back another day.
When we did, he excitedly welcomed us in and invited us to sit down at the dining room
table, which separated the tiny kitchen from the meager living room. We pulled out our chairs
and sat down. L-dog made small talk as he searched through the cabinets for some juice mix. He
found it, grabbed a pitcher halfway full of water, and then came and joined us on the opposite
side of the table.
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He told us how he “love [himself] some purple drank” and started pouring in a generous
amount of mix, which looked like off-brand grape-Kool-Aid. After what seemed like more than
enough, and when I finally thought he was finished, he took the lid off the carton and poured in
the rest of the container. Stirring it with a long metal spoon, he held the pitcher to his mouth,
took a sip, smacked his lips, and said, “Got it just right”; smiled and asked, “Want some?”
I replied, “No thank you,” thinking in my head I didn’t want diabetes, and my companion
said no as well. We continued our conversation. He told us about the Tiger Woods scandal in
graphic detail, despite our attempts to switch the conversation, and then began to brag about how
“adaptable” he was. He explained how you could drop him in the middle of Brazil amongst a
cannibalistic tribe and he would survive, because he knew how to fit in. He said though, on the
flip side, if you put him with the cannibals on Wall Street, in a board meeting with the wealthiest
CEO’s in the country, that he could also “talk the talk” and “walk the walk.”
We thought he was crazy, or at least I did. We ran into a lot of people like him on the
street, usually drunk, but L-dog wasn’t drunk. He was just crazy. That’s what made it fun. He
was funny. We laughed with him, but mostly at him. We decided to try and get back to our
purpose as missionaries and be more serious, so we asked him a little bit about his family. He got
up from the kitchen table, walked a few steps to the other side of the living room to the TV stand,
where he had a small golden picture frame he grabbed and brought back for us to see. He handed
it to me and explained that it was a photo of his son. The twenty-year-old boy in the picture was
in Class A military attire. “Oh cool,” I said, surprised he had a son in the military.
L-dog told us that his son was in the Marines, that he went to Afghanistan and that they
“sent him home in a box.” I looked up confused, still smiling at how lively he was, thinking it
was a joke—or another one of his weird expressions—but his face was serious. He told us that
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his son was blown up by a grenade and came home in “three pieces.” “Oh,” I realized. I didn’t
know what to say. The mood shifted. He sat down again and slumped in his chair. The sun
shined softly through the window onto his mostly bald head. My companion and I sat motionless
and just stared. My breathing slowed. We had an arsenal of lessons and scriptures about life after
death we could have used to comfort him, but none of them felt right. All we could do was sit
and look at him as he sat slumped, lost in thoughts too sacred to interrupt. After about thirty
seconds though, which felt like an hour, he perked up and said, “Ya’ll sure you’re not thirsty?”
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS
The above vignettes constitute what a lyrical sociology might look like if it were to be
deliberately produced from the onset. Following the rules of the stance and mechanics of the
writer, as detailed in chapter two, I sought to adhere to what Abbott and other experts on the
genre have suggested. In this chapter, I discuss the insights I gained from actually writing my
own lyrical vignettes—as opposed to simply theorizing about the lyric from past works—and
point to some of the intentional literary moves I made while constructing them. I also relate and
reflect on a few of the experiences others and I had while reading and rereading them in order to
provide more insights into the writing and reading process. All of this I do in hopes of helping to
further bridge the gap between the theory of the lyric and the application of it.
Lessons Learned: Writing
In writing the vignettes, I had to be sure to maintain the lyrical position of not taking a
position, at least explicitly. I had to withhold judgment, resist the urge to moralize, overcome the
temptation to draw “objective” conclusions based on my observations, add present-perspective
commentary, apologize for the unflattering way I viewed the city then, use technical language, or
coerce—explicitly or implicitly—the reader to a specific point. Instead, I sought to simply tell of
my experiences, and to treat them the way empiricists treat data; to let them speak for themselves
(Öhlen 2003:565). 64
Avoid Concluding and Moralizing
The temptation to tell the reader what I wanted them to understand from my vignettes—

Any reflection or analysis I did upon my experience would be an interpretation and, in a sense, just as valid as
anyone else’s. The point in writing these as stand-alone vignettes was to allow the whole of the experience to be
interpreted without the need for interpreting my interpretations. It was to “draw an audience into a collective
experience in which a version of truth is demonstrated for the collective to judge” (Butler 1997:928). To try and
interpret or analyze during the vignettes would compromise the whole endeavor by breaking the continuity of lived
experiences I was trying to relate (see van Manen 1997:353).
64
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to wrap-up, conclude, or moralize—was especially difficult at the end. In the early drafting, I
used titles to help me keep track of what experiences I was telling and where I was at in them.
For my last fragment, I literally used to words, “Wrap-up” as the title for it and wrote a vignette
attempting to do so (to wrap it up). This however, from a lyrical perspective, is counterproductive.
The art of lyrical writing is that if it is done correctly, an understanding will come on its
own, without having to tell anything, conclude, or wrap-up, which is in sharp contrast to
narrative writing (see note 20). Narrative writing demands that the writer ties everything back in
for the reader. It requires a definitive conclusion to be drawn. However, the lyric advocates for
more openness to the world, which allows it (the world) to speak to you, in the way it (the
writing about the world) speaks to you. Needless to say, I changed both the title and the content
of my last vignette.
Abbott suggests that we should also avoid moralizing. He calls those who don’t implicate
themselves “distanced and judgmental,” whose view of the world we only see through “the
writing about it that makes them so angry” (2007a:74). However, this is okay when the
“engagement remains immediate, almost apperceptive.” For example, when I was at the auto
show reflecting upon my own culture (white, middle-class) this was done from the perspective of
me at that time. And, I implicated myself back into that very culture, even as I was questioning
it, when I took a photo of the black girl in the mini-van, as if she was an animal at the zoo.
Passion over Perspective
In Abbott’s (2007a) piece, he references Nicholas Christakis’ (1999) book Death
Foretold, which discusses the dysfunctions of prognostication, as an example of a lyric that
could easily have been a narrative. He describes how one would have expected the book to start
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with an account of “patients and their illnesses,” then “doctors and their qualities,” and finally
“the flow of prognostic information throughout the disease course,” but instead, Christakis
“simply circles around the image of the doctors telling (more often, not telling) patients about the
future” (76). Of Christakis, Abbott writes, “He is not an abstracted sociologist outside the
situation, nor is he a consistent advocate for one or another position within the ranks of medicine
itself” (77). Though Christakis might be unbiased, he is not neutral.
I had spent two years living in the heart of Detroit and, as a sociologist, have made
understanding the city part of my professional pursuit. Throughout both my experience and my
studies, I have formed definite opinions as to the reasons for Detroit’s unique circumstances, to
say the least, as well as have had many thoughts as to how to help or change it. I have more firsthand experience than most who theorize about this particular city. However, according to the
lyric, this still does not give me the grounds to speak down my viewpoint with authority. The
lyric is a humble endeavor in that it seeks above all to “emphasize the vividness of [my] passion
toward the world [I study]” (Abbott 2007a:76) not my perspective on it. Only then can the reader
truly understand for themselves what was seen and felt, instead of having to rely upon the
writer’s word alone.
The Feeling of Ambivalence
Abbott says that the real aim of Christakis was, “to make us feel the damnable
ambivalence doctors face about prognosis; indeed, the damnable ambivalence he himself feels as
a practicing physician” (2007a:77). The purpose of his writing was not to argue one side of the
issue or prescribe a solution to reconcile the two sides, but rather to help the reader to feel the
tension between two contradictory perspectives. Evoking these feelings of “damnable
ambivalence” is precisely what makes authors like Christakis “hard to pin down” (77). It allows
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the reader to have a more open relationship with the writer because just as the writer has refused
to reduce the social world he or she writes about, they themselves become less reducible, or less
able to be reduced.
Likewise, in my vignettes, I sought for ambivalence in writing them. For example, just
like there is an apparent virtue to “tattle-telling, whistle-blowing, or narking” (as described in the
section on Robby Austin); there is also the virtue of loyalty, confidentiality, and shared
vulnerability between the missionaries and the “criminals.” As Deener (2017:374) suggests in a
recent piece, “Rather than seeing ambiguity [i.e. ambivalence] as something sociologists should
avoid or need to overcome… ambiguity can be used as an asset in the development of cases.”
Thus, throughout my writing, I always tried to convey my complex thoughts and feelings.
Perhaps the best lyricists are themselves conflicted. Like the approach itself, they don’t just
present ambivalent situations, they themselves are ambivalent, “hard to pin down.”
Common Language and Informality
Abbott writes, “Wordsworth wanted lyric to be expressed in common language. So, too,
do we now say sociology should be written in simple terms, not in jargon” (2007a:72). I took this
informal approach in my essays. Like most qualitative approaches, I tried to insert dialog
between Detroiters and me which was not polished up, interpreted, or second-hand, but raw, real,
and direct. I also sought to use the kind of language and thinking I would have used then, which
was pre-sociological. 65
Another way of capturing the informal tone of the lyric was to be vulnerable and honest
with the reader, revealing my personal emotional reality, fears, and anxieties. Self-disclosure
adds to the common subjectivity of the text and helps to set up a relationship with the reader who
This language of the lifeworld (Habermas 1984) may actually become harder to access the more one becomes
devoted to the scientific or intellectual sphere (Weber 1958).
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hopefully reciprocates and realizes their own emotional nature. Informality and nonimpersonality has the ability to break down barriers between people, whether it be between the
writer and the reader themselves, or between disciplines, who’s specialized technical language is
understandable only to those trained in that discipline.
Time and Context
The structure of my lyrical vignettes was intentionally non-linear. They jumped around in
time. Chronological order doesn’t matter in the way it does in narrative writing. This is because
the focus was the emotional mosaic of my experiences, not the cause and effect relationship of
events. In lyricism, memory is more important than chronology. For some of the experiences, I
just remembered that they happened, not exactly when they happened. I could have looked
throughout my journals to pinpoint exact dates, but that would have been beyond the point. The
point was to create a collaged emotional effect, which any independent vignette could add to.
The lyric gives the author the freedom and ability to jump wherever they want in time.
Though sometimes, in order to give the jump context, the writer first has a literary obligation to
provide such context, which a narrative (starting from the beginning) builds into itself by nature.
I did this in individual fragments, such as in the vignette of the house fire when I told about how
common fires were, and in the whole paper, as I did with discussing my childhood fears, which
gave the context for the abnormal fear of violence or “craziness”—as I considered it—I both
dreaded and experienced in Detroit.
Generalization of the Particular
With the lyric, the goal is to allow the reader to decide for him or herself whether there is
a generalization to be made, a truth to be discovered. Lopate (1995:xl) writes how, “The concrete
details of personal experience earn the generalization (often an aphorism), and the generalization
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sends the author [and reader] back for more particulars.” Now, we must be careful here, like we
discussed in chapter 1, to not mix “‘large’ and ‘small’ things” (Abbott 2007a:80). The move
from the micro to the macro (and back) can quickly become a narrative one. The difference is in
the type of movement, or the type of generalization, that the lyric is bringing about.
Abbott (2007a:94) describes how in encountering other’s “mutability and particularity,
we see our own.” This is because the chasm between readers and subjects is crossed by “moral
recognition of the common humanity we share with those we read about.” This is the chasm that
I crossed upon hearing about L-dog’s son who died in the war. It left me motionless and
speechless, because when I saw him in a moment of sincerity and unveiled suffering, it stopped
me from seeing him as mere entertainment. I stopped seeing him as part of the story I had
constructed about Detroit and Detroiters like him. Abbott says that this “tense yoking of the
vertigo of indexical difference with the comfort of human sympathy” is “the central emotion
aroused by lyrical sociology” (95).
Lessons Learned: Reading
I also had valuable experiences from interacting with others who read my vignettes and
from reading the vignettes myself, which yielded further insights into the challenges and
opportunities of the lyrical approach.
With Others
Throughout the various stages this thesis has gone through, I had the opportunity from
time to time to share my vignettes with professors, friends, strangers, and even people from
Detroit. On the scholarly level, I noticed a disconnect for some between the experience of the
lyric and the subsequent evaluation of it. There were certain people (professors and graduate
students both within and outside the discipline of sociology) who would generally enjoy reading
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of my experiences in Detroit—and resonate with them, as intended, on an emotional level—but
afterwards, they would question their sociological value. 66 Abbott tells how reviewers of
Malinowski’s Argonauts of the Western Pacific and E. P. Thompson’s The Making of the English
Working Class—both of which he identifies as lyrical—had similar reactions to the readers I
mention. He says of some of the reviewers, that they “appreciated [the books] extraordinary
passion and vividness but thought they saw an insufficiently coherent narrative or argument. . . .
Readers are thus often unwilling to read the lyrical text as anything but a failed narrative”
(2007a:95). This is likewise what happened with my vignettes and, to a large extent, is what the
other sections of the thesis attempt to address (especially chapters 1-3)—the value of such a nonnarrative mode of comprehension.
Another experience I had when sharing my vignettes with people came from presenting
at a poster session. During this, strangers and colleagues (those who knew me but not my work)
walked around the session room and had the chance to get an elevator version of different
people’s current research. My poster was organized very much like my paper: introducing lyrical
sociology, telling what it is (i.e. the required stance and mechanics), then a sample vignette, and
ending with a brief conclusion. When people started at the top left with the theory, their eyes
would start to glaze over, and their faces would become evidently disinterested before they even
got to the vignettes, if they got to them at all. (The same thing happened when I would describe
my poster out loud as well). Then, I switched my approach.
When people now came to my poster, I would tell them to read the vignette first (the one
about the house fire). I would watch them and could tell where they were at in it by their audible

What I’m saying is that these were not people who “criticize[ed] the lens after looking at it instead of through it”
(Lewis 1961:35). They were people who read the vignettes and enjoyed them but would then immediately revert to
narrative ways of thinking, almost unwittingly.
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and visual cues (laughing at my unsuccessful Spanish joke and grinning in disbelief about the
guy who continued mowing his lawn behind the burning house). After they finished, I could
explain to them what just happened, how the way in which I wrote up the story of the house fire
vignette evoked feelings in them and gave a different understanding of an instance in Detroit that
other sociological approaches were less equipped to capture and transmit. They were much more
engaged in these discussions after they had an experience with an example of lyrical sociology
than when they just read about it in the abstract.
The last insight I gained from having other people read my vignettes occurred when I
shared my paper with a contact from Detroit. The individual, who at one point was deeply
involved in one of South West Detroit’s most prominent gangs, is not featured in any of the
current vignettes (though in the draft stages I had actually written one about him). However, he
enjoyed reading about my different experiences with other people and situations and remarked
that, although he usually didn’t like to read, he read the whole piece in one sitting. For him, it
sparked memories of certain streets and places he used to walk and visit in Detroit (he has since
moved out of the city). He told me about these specific instances that my piece brought to his
mind in great detail, almost lyrical detail. The interesting point here then was that by reading of
my experiences, it opened him up to his own.
My own
My own experiences reading and rereading my vignettes have also varied throughout the
numerous stages of constructing them. As well, my experience as a reader is surely different than
others because the experiences being conveyed are/were my own. Yet, it is interesting how I
resonate with different vignettes at different times, as if sometimes I can’t empathize with the
writer who I once was and other times I understand myself and my experiences in such new
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ways that it’s as if I am only now finally coming to see who I always was. 67 This makes the
reading experience more like if I was actually reading someone else’s stories. The person I was
when I wrote them and the person I am when I am reading them are two different people.
Therefore, similar reader-writer dynamics are still at play even when I am/was both writer and
reader.
One interesting but, to a large extent, unfortunate thing that has happened since I have
written about my experiences in Detroit—and have subsequently read, edited, and re-written
them many times—is that many of my raw memories have been replaced by the words I have
finally settled on to relate these experiences. When I think back to the time I live in Detroit, for
the memories I have written about, I actually think now to the text itself rather than to the
memories that gave rise to the text. Therefore, my experience has become one-step removed and
my real memories blurred with my constructed memories, which are always a necessary
reduction.
From the writer’s point of view, this is a sacrifice or a gift. But, from the reader’s, it is a
welcome offering. For the reader of another person’s experiences, words are all they have.
Because of this, the real and the imagined are not blurred because the imagined is the real, for
them, and is all there is. The real is imagined through the words such that knowledge of
particular events can be retained like muscle-memory in the same way that real memories are
embedded in the mind through processes of subjective experience. As Attridge (2017:158) writes
of poetry:

Iser (1972:285) writes, “On a second reading familiar occurrences now tend to appear in a new light and seem to
be at times corrected, at times enriched.” This is why reflection is valuable as a writer, which, in one form of it,
literally entails reading what you write. Rereading your own work is a reflexive enterprise, yet, though reflective as
it may be, the text doesn’t necessarily “reflect” in the same way every time. The text, and you, evolve
simultaneously, making the rereading process refining to both.
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What I carry away from my reading of the poem is not primarily an idea or an image, or a
series of ideas and images, but a memory of this specific sequence of words, a memory
suffused by the qualities of my experience of them—and, paradoxical as it may sound,
this memory may remain even when I have forgotten the words. As long as I retain a
memory of the “form” of the words, of how they happened, and happened to me, in a
certain order, and with certain effects, I retain something of the poem.
Thus, reading works of poetry, literature, or lyrical sociology can have lingering effects on
readers in the same way that real experience does—through memories, whether conscious or not.
The last lesson I learned from reading and rereading my vignettes is that lyrical (or
literary) experience cannot be forced. I remember at one point in the research and writing process
ambitiously seeking to experiment with my own vignettes to see what sort of value I could get
from them by reading them over and over again. As a believer in the principle of rereading, I
thought that I could extract an infinite amount of new knowledge if I persistently returned to the
text with an ever-examining eye. However, despite (or because of) these grand intentions, I
ended up just making myself frustrated. All of the connections I was drawing were narrative
ones, and speculative to say the least. I wasn’t feeling anything like I had during previous
readings. I was simply trying too hard. Once I realized this though, I was able to “relax into
lyricism” (Abbott 2007a:75) and the appropriate feelings, insights, and intuitions started again to
flow. 68

Attridge (2017:180) again hits the nail on the head: “The ethics of literary reading is less a matter of the exercise
of a certain kind of effort on each reading—though it is that (including the effort of disencumbering the reading
self)—than a disposition, a habit, a way of being in the world of words.”
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CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have sought to situate and expound upon the theory of the lyric as well as
construct, and document, for the first time, a lyrical sociology from the ground up in a way
congruent with the principles of Abbott’s innovative 2007 piece. Unlike the narratives of
traditional social science, my aim was not at explanation, but at the emotional center of
experience. From implementing the lyrical stance and mechanics, I have presented a series of
vignettes that give the reader a sense of the emotional reality of the inner-city, as experienced by
me—the experiencer—who is just as real a person as the people and situations I wrote about. By
not denying my own subjectivity, while at the same time being careful not to impose it, I hope to
have demonstrated the value of the lyric in helping readers to witness social phenomena in a
more inclusive way. And, by evoking the reader’s own responses of humane sympathy, to see the
world in “different ways” and through “different lenses” (Abbott 2007a:76), it is, as Abbott
envisions, “our best hope for a humanist sociology, one that can be profoundly moral without
being political” (96).
Regarding the future of lyrical sociology, one bold approach would be to take it in the
direction of the ethical as I have suggested. This could build off other work Abbott has recently
done on the need for a normative subdiscipline in the field of sociology (Abbott 2018). The
ethical, as I have conceived it—from a Levinasian perspective—would differ somewhat from the
blend of canonical and legalistic normative approaches he recommends. But, even taking up a
not so perfect conception of the normative would still be a good start. In the even further future,
perhaps, the field of sociology could see its own “double turn” as the field of literature and moral
philosophy has seen—where there was a “‘turn to ethics’ in literary studies and, conversely, a
‘turn to literature’ in (moral) philosophy” (Eskin 2004:557). The sociological equivalent, though,
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would be a turn to lyrical sociology (Abbott 2007a) in normative inquiry (Abbott 2018) and a
turn to ethics (the present piece) in lyrical sociology.
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TABLES
Table 1: Criteria for Lyrical Sociology
1

Emotionally
Engaged
Yes

Subjectively
Located
Yes

Temporally
Present
Yes

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No

No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No

Example(s)*
Zorbaugh, Malinowski, Bell,
Christakis, Thompson
Fleck
Verdery, Burawoy
Massey and Denton
Riesman, Leach
Snook

*Note: These are all tentative placements since Abbott doesn’t specify whether each work meets all the conditions
or not. I also note that rows 5 and 6 of those answering in the affirmative to the “engaged emotionally” condition,
are (mostly) all emotionally engaged, to different degrees, in non-lyrical ways.
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FIGURES
Figure 1: Narrative vs. Lyrical
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